Too Much of a Good Thing: Moralism and Its Two Sources

Vaccarezza, Maria Silvia; Zuolo, Federico

In this paper, we provide a novel definition of moralism as a failure in moral judgment, and we seek to identify its two main sources (relational and substantive). After defining moralism, we spell out a taxonomy of different kinds of moralism, the opposite—yet equally defective—moral failures, and the corresponding correct attitudes. Then, we examine how some proximate notions (judgmentalism, moral fury, hypocrisy, paternalism, puritanism, moral grandstanding) may have parallels with or differ from one or more of the four kinds of moralism identified. Finally, we argue that for there to be moralism, we must presuppose some features inherent in moral judgment which moralism perturbs in terms of its exercise and legitimate area of competence.

What is moralism? Besides being pervasive in many public arenas and in some academic debates, moralism is also the ordinary and intuitive experience of one person accusing another of inappropriate judgment or behavior. In its commonsensical understanding, it is assumed to represent a mistaken attitude. Yet, why exactly this is the case is a normative question that remains a matter of some debate and controversy. Think of a politician, for example, whose private behavior is publicly put in question as immoral. Suppose the politician rebuts these charges as moralistic: what exactly is the politician accusing the opponents of? Or, imagine that a friend criticizes you for donating only a small sum to a charity supporting refugees. You may feel distressed by this intrusion and label the friend as a moralist. What do you mean by that? Alternatively, imagine that a complete stranger, who happens to learn some facts about your personal life, emails you concerning…

Click here to download full article