Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy

Jack Spencer has recently argued that somebody might be able to do the impossible.  In response, Anthony Nguyen has argued against Spencer’s arguments. In this paper, I do not argue against Spencer’s arguments. Instead, I argue directly against Spencer’s thesis. In the first part of my paper, I develop an argument that suggests that it is implausible that somebody is able to do the impossible (because somebody who is able to do the impossible would be able to do something that would have incredible consequences). In the second part of…

The nominal ground that entwines human beings and animal behaviours is unwilling to admit moral valuing as a non-human act. Just to nail it down explicitly, two clauses ramify the moral conscience of human beings as follows: a) Can non-humans be moral beings?, b) Unconscious animal behaviours go beyond any moral judgments. My approach aims to rebuff these anthropomorphic clauses by justifying animals’ moral beings and animals’ moral behaviours from a meta-ethical stance. A meta-ethical outlook may enable an analysis of ethical and normative views through the limit of moral…

In this paper, first of all, I want to give a criterion for the perceivability of higher-level properties, i.e., the properties that depend for their own instantiation on the instantiation of low-level properties (colors, shapes, sounds, textures …); namely, conditions that are necessary and jointly sufficient in order for such a property to be perceivable. Here it is: the higher-level property is given i) immediately; ii) via a grouping operation that involves a perceptual form of attention. Moreover, I want to show why some candidate higher-level properties fulfill it and…

In the debate about the reach of perceptual content, some philosophers have appealed to empirical effects as a test for the existence of high-level perception (HLP). Among these effects, perceptual adaptation and perceptual learning have played a major role. In this paper, I will discuss two skeptical challenges to relying on these effects as tests for HLP. The first challenge interrogates their nature as a perceptual process. The second challenge raises doubts regarding their usefulness in specifying the target high-level property.

Fred Dretske made important contributions to the debate concerning how to distinguish perception from cognition, to the question of whether perceptual content is ‘Rich’ or ‘Sparse’ and to developing the thesis that perceptual experience employs a distinctively iconic format of representation. In Dretske (2015) he offered a method or criterion for determining whether or not two subjects have visual experiences with different phenomenal characters, which he dubbed the ‘Goldilocks Test’. In this paper I criticize Dretske’s proposal, drawing on various visual phenomena in order to argue that this ‘Goldilocks Test’…

The usual considerations about high-level properties perception focus on contents of perceptual experiences. While different types of high-level properties are considered, such as category-related, causal, emotional, and aesthetic, they are all interpreted as elements of experiential content. This paper introduces a new category of perceptual properties—structural phenomenal properties—by utilizing the important distinction between experiential contents and experiential structures. It is argued that while these are not content-properties, some of them have characteristics typical of high-level content properties. In particular, three structural phenomenal properties related to the visual field will be…

This paper addresses the topic of the expressive qualities of inanimate objects. More specifically, it examines how qualities referring to psychological states, such as cheerfulness, melancholy, liveliness, and sadness, can be attributed to non-sentient things. After presenting some of the main theoretical approaches to this issue in contemporary debates—including projective, arousal, persona, and contour theories—I argue that these approaches struggle to explain how the same expressive qualities can be ascribed to diverse things, such as an atmosphere, a piece of music, a personal feeling, or a bodily expression. As a…

This paper investigates the perceptual nature of affective properties—qualities such as sadness, excitement, boredom, or comfort—that we experience as belonging to objects, environments, or events. I propose a taxonomy that distinguishes three classes of affective properties: arousal properties, expressive properties, and affective affordances, each characterized by different relations to perception, affectivity, and response dependence. Drawing on philosophical accounts of high-level perception and ecological psychology, I argue that these properties can be considered at least partly perceptual insofar as they contribute to the phenomenal character of experience. I then explore how…

In this paper, we apply a Herzberger-style semantics to deal with the question: is the de Finetti conditional a conditional? The question is pressing, in view of the inferential behavior of the de Finetti conditional: it allows for inferences that seem quite unexpected for a conditional. The semantics we advance here for the de Finetti conditional is simply the classical semantics for material conditional, with a further dimension whose understanding depends on the kind of application one has in mind. We discuss such possible applications and how they cover ground…