intentionality - Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy https://www.argumenta.org Journal of Analytic Philosophy Sun, 14 Jul 2024 14:57:59 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=7.1.3 Being an Experience as the Mark of the Mental [Special Issue] https://www.argumenta.org/article/being-an-experience-as-the-mark-of-the-mental-special-issue/ Sun, 14 Jul 2024 14:57:59 +0000 https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&p=2247 In this paper, I want to revive an old proposal regarding the venerable issue of the mark of the mental, i.e., the quest for both necessary and jointly sufficient conditions in order for something—primarily a state, but also an event, or even a property—to be mental. This quest was originally revived by Brentano when he […]

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]]> Acquaintance and the Qualitative Character of Conscious Intentional States [Special Issue] https://www.argumenta.org/article/acquaintance-and-the-qualitative-character-of-conscious-intentional-states-special-issue/ Sun, 14 Jul 2024 14:42:30 +0000 https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&p=2239 There is a peculiar way chocolate melting in your mouth tastes to you; there is a different, (equally peculiar) way the gray sky over your head looks to you; and there is yet a different way brushing against a burning-hot iron, or being irritated by a careless behavior feel to you. For each of these […]

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]]> Analytic Phenomenology and the Inseparatism Thesis [Special Issue] https://www.argumenta.org/article/analytic-phenomenology-and-the-inseparatism-thesis-special-issue/ Sun, 14 Jul 2024 14:33:39 +0000 https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&p=2235 A phenomenological turn has occurred in contemporary philosophy of mind. Some philosophers working on the nature of intentionality and consciousness have turned away from views that construe the basic ingredients of intentionality in terms of naturalistic tracking relations that hold between thinkers and external conditions in their environment in favor of what has been called […]

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]]> Is Intentionality a Relation? A Dialogue [Special Issue] https://www.argumenta.org/article/is-intentionality-a-relation-a-dialogue-special-issue/ Sun, 14 Jul 2024 14:28:44 +0000 https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&p=2233 David: Should we write this paper in the form of a dialogue? This would allow us to explore the ideas we disagree on without having to reach an agreement. Angela: I don’t know. People would probably think it’s boring and annoying. I don’t want to be the target of ridicule. David: On your view, it’s […]

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]]> Analytic Phenomenology: A Guided Tour [Special Issue] https://www.argumenta.org/article/analytic-phenomenology-a-guided-tour-special-issue/ Sun, 14 Jul 2024 14:16:24 +0000 https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&p=2229 For some years now, a veritable ‘phenomenological turn’ has been taking place in analytic philosophy: ideas developed by phenomenologists such as Brentano, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty or Sartre are being echoed by an increasing number of analytic philosophers of mind. This article attempts to flesh out this claim by providing some details about the themes, names and […]

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]]> Toward a General Model of Agency https://www.argumenta.org/article/toward-a-general-model-of-agency/ Tue, 06 Jun 2023 14:26:28 +0000 https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&p=1911 The majority of accounts of agency in the literature adopt some degree of intentionality or mentality as a necessary condition for agency. This choice inevitably restricts the scope of the definition to human agency, as it requires the psychological and cognitive abilities of a functioning human being to develop intentions or mental states. On the […]

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]]> Demystifying Davidson: Radical Interpretation meets Radical Enactivism [Special Issue] https://www.argumenta.org/article/demystifying-davidson-radical-interpretation-meets-radical-enactivism-special-issue/ Wed, 17 Jan 2018 15:38:40 +0000 https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&p=783 Any naturalist worth his or her salt, even if methodologically non-reductionist, should seek to make the connections between contentful thought and the natural world non-mysterious. Davidson’s signature ideas on the holism and autonomy of propositional thought have led some exegetes to hold that he advances a kind of transcenden talism that is discordant with a […]

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]]> Norm and Failure in Mind and Meaning [Special Issue] https://www.argumenta.org/article/norm-failure-mind-meaning-special-issue/ Wed, 17 Jan 2018 15:14:34 +0000 https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&p=775 Donald Davidson was a pioneer among philosophers in arguing that normativity was central to understanding human behaviour and that it was what set apart the understanding and explanation of human behaviour from how  we understand and explain all other phenomena. Though it is true that long before him, philosophers, in resisting the overreaching claims of […]

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]]> Intentional Relations [Special Issue] https://www.argumenta.org/article/intentional-relations/ Tue, 20 Jun 2017 00:08:10 +0000 https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&p=682 In some intentional states, the mind is related to the world. When I think about Obama, I stand in a relation to him: the state I am in could not exist unless he exists. In other intentional states, this straightforward relationality is absent, for two familiar reasons: (a) my intentional state is directed at something […]

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]]> Husserlian Intentionality and Contingent Universals [Special Issue] https://www.argumenta.org/article/husserlian-intentionality-contingent-universals/ Mon, 19 Jun 2017 23:54:52 +0000 https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&p=680 Some philosophers believe in universals and some dismiss them as a myth. The former think that, in addition to—say—all red things, there is a further thing: the property of being red. Disbelievers, by contrast, have it that the property of being red is at worst a mere façon de parler, at best a linguistic, conceptual […]

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