Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy

 

Author Meets Critics. Session on Metaphysical Emergence: Replies [Book Symposium]

Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Jessica M. Wilson
Topics: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ontology, Philosophy of Biology, Philosophy of language, Philosophy of mind, Philosophy of science, Philosophy of Time

Agency without Action: On Responsibility for Omissions

Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Sofia Bonicalzi, Mario De Caro
Topics: Epistemology, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action, Theoretical philosophy

In the last few years, there has been a growing philosophical interest in the problem of moral responsibility for omissions. Like actions, however, omissions are not all-of-a-kind. Recently, most of the research effort in this field has been devoted to the so-called unwitting omissions. However, in some cases, people make clear-eyed, or quasi-clear-eyed, decisions about not interfering with a given course of action potentially having unethical consequences (let’s call these decisions witting omissions). In this paper, we abstract away from the epistemic concerns that typically refer to unwitting omissions to…

I Don’t Feel like That! A Phenomenology-Free Approach to Moods

Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Daniele Cassaghi
Topics: Epistemology, Philosophy of mind, Theoretical philosophy

People in moods usually claim that they feel in a certain way, and yet they also say that moods are undirected states. If one takes these reports at face value, moods are a counterexample to representationalism, namely the doctrine of a necessary connection between phenomenal character and content. The standard representationalist answer is to deny moods’ undirectedness in order to capture the phenomenal character of moods. I go in the opposite direction: I will deny moods’ phenomenal character and secure moods’ undirectedness instead. I will show that both our folk-psychological…

Our Admiration for Exemplars and the Impartial Spectator Perspective: Moral Exemplarism and Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments

Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Karsten R. Stueber
Topics: Epistemology, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action, Theoretical philosophy

This essay will discuss the philosophical viability of Linda Zagzebski’s refreshingly radical theory of moral exemplarism that attempts to elucidate the nature of human morality through an analysis of the structure of our admiration for morally exemplary individuals. After raising some systematic worries about exemplarism, I will turn to Adam Smith and his Theory of Moral Sentiments. There are indeed strands in Smith’s thoughts that contain an exemplarist flavor. Nevertheless, from the Smithian perspective that I favor, our moral concepts emerge from the everyday practice of holding each other morally…

Charity and Altruism: Rational Requirements for Action

Issue: Issue 20 • Author/s: Caterina Di Maio
Topics: Epistemology, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action, Philosophy of mind

This paper discusses the possibility of altruism based on the linguistic, and then practical notion of charity, to distinguish it from psychological and ethical selfishness. My starting hypothesis is, as Thomas Nagel argued, that altruism could be interpreted as a rational requirement for action. This hypothesis arises from a specific approach in analytical philosophy to the problem of explaining action, which combines the concepts of charity and altruism in a single interpretative framework about others. My aim is to present a common thread linking the thought of Willard Van Orman…

The Transplant Intuition as an Argument for the Biological Approach

Issue: Issue 20 • Author/s: Alfonso Muñoz-Corcuera
Topics: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ontology, Philosophy of Biology, Philosophy of mind

One of the primary objections to the biological approach revolves around what is known as the transplant intuition. That is, the allegedly widely shared intuition that if we had our cerebrum transplanted into a different body, we would be transferred to that body along with our cerebrum. Drawing upon our understanding of brain death, this paper argues that either (1) the transplant intuition should be rejected, and the biological approach has the advantage of being consistent with that rejection; or (2) the psychological approach, the biological approach’s main rival, cannot…

Liberal Naturalism, Human Sciences, and Psychoanalysis

Issue: Issue 20 • Author/s: Ricardo Navia
Topics: Epistemology, Meta-Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of mind

In this text I intend to show to what extent a certain epistemological understanding of psychoanalysis (fundamentally Freudian) finds parallels with the so-called liberalization process of epistemological naturalism. My thesis is that the sui generis epistemological modalities created by Freud not only coincide with this process, but to a significant degree were precursors of the methodological and ontological innovations that LN (liberal naturalism) proposes to defend and theorize. I begin by reviewing the process of liberalization of epistemic naturalism, from a predominantly physicalist model to a liberal version that takes…

Action-Perception Matching in Human Cultural Evolution: Updates from the Cognitive Science Debate

Issue: Issue 20 • Author/s: Antonella Tramacere, Fabrizio Mafessoni
Topics: Cognitive science, Ecology, Epistemology, Philosophy of action, Philosophy of Medicine

Analyses of action-perception matching mechanisms, such as the Mirror Neuron System (MNS), have been prominent in evolutionary accounts of human cognition. Some scholars have interpreted data on the MNS to suggest that the human capacity to acquire and transmit cultural information is a learned product of cultural evolution (the Culture not Biology Account of cultural learning). Others have interpreted results related to the MNS to suggest that cultural learning in humans result from both cultural and biological evolution (the Culture per biology Account of cultural learning). In this paper, we…

Between the Proximal and the Distal: An Interpretation of Quine’s Semantics

Issue: Issue 20 • Author/s: Marta Maria Vilardo
Topics: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ontology, Philosophy of language

The debate on internalism/externalism both in semantics and in epistemology concerns the core relations between the mind and the world. I will use this dichotomy to assess whether and how optimal coordination can be worked out between the different parts of Quine’s philosophy: semantics and epistemology in his earlier development. Since Quine has emphasized that his examination of translation is epistemological and since his epistemological project is an internalist one, it should be logical to assume that his semantics proceeded in the same way. But in Word and Object it…

Book Reviews

Issue: Issue 20 • Author/s: Massimo Dell’Utri, Alessandro Guerra, Gloria Zuccarelli
Topics: book reviews, Epistemology, Meta-Philosophy, Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Political philosophy

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