Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy

The usual considerations about high-level properties perception focus on contents of perceptual experiences. While different types of high-level properties are considered, such as category-related, causal, emotional, and aesthetic, they are all interpreted as elements of experiential content. This paper introduces a new category of perceptual properties—structural phenomenal properties—by utilizing the important distinction between experiential contents and experiential structures. It is argued that while these are not content-properties, some of them have characteristics typical of high-level content properties. In particular, three structural phenomenal properties related to the visual field will be…

This paper addresses the topic of the expressive qualities of inanimate objects. More specifically, it examines how qualities referring to psychological states, such as cheerfulness, melancholy, liveliness, and sadness, can be attributed to non-sentient things. After presenting some of the main theoretical approaches to this issue in contemporary debates—including projective, arousal, persona, and contour theories—I argue that these approaches struggle to explain how the same expressive qualities can be ascribed to diverse things, such as an atmosphere, a piece of music, a personal feeling, or a bodily expression. As a…

This paper investigates the perceptual nature of affective properties—qualities such as sadness, excitement, boredom, or comfort—that we experience as belonging to objects, environments, or events. I propose a taxonomy that distinguishes three classes of affective properties: arousal properties, expressive properties, and affective affordances, each characterized by different relations to perception, affectivity, and response dependence. Drawing on philosophical accounts of high-level perception and ecological psychology, I argue that these properties can be considered at least partly perceptual insofar as they contribute to the phenomenal character of experience. I then explore how…

Tyler Burge (2010) provided a scathing critique of all programs for naturalizing concepts of representation, especially teleological naturalizing programs. He intended to demonstrate that “representational content” is a concept that cannot be reduced to more fundamental biological or physical ideas. According to him, since the 1970s, the concept of representational content has been firmly established in cognitive psychology as a mature science and utilized in adequate explanations. Since Dretske’s program is Burge’s primary objective, this paper concentrates on Dretske’s perspective. Following Burge’s criticisms, I concur that Dretske’s naturalizing program trivializes…