The AI Ethics Principle of Autonomy in Health Recommender Systems
Issue: Issue 20 • Author/s: Simona Tiribelli
Topics: Ethics, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of AI, Philosophy of Medicine
The application of health recommender systems (HRSs) in the mobile-health (m-health) industry, especially for healthy active aging, has grown exponentially over the past decade. However, no research has been conducted on the ethical implications of HRSs and the ethical principles for their design. This paper aims to fill this gap and claims that an ethically informed re-definition of the AI ethics principle of autonomy is needed to design HRSs that adequately operationalize (that is, respect and promote) individuals’ autonomy over ageing. To achieve this goal, after having clarified the state-of-the-art on…
Book Reviews
Issue: Issue 20 • Author/s: Massimo Dell’Utri, Alessandro Guerra, Gloria Zuccarelli
Topics: book reviews, Epistemology, Meta-Philosophy, Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Political philosophy
Intra-Personal Compromises
Issue: Issue 21 • Author/s: Juha Räikkä
Topics: Epistemology, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action
The most usual philosophical questions about compromises have been those related to inter-personal compromises, in which parties are compromising with each other, rather than intra-personal compromises, which are often psychologically demanding. This paper aims to fill the gap in the discussion and briefly analyze the nature of intra-personal compromises. The starting point here is the assumption that inter-personal compromises cannot be made without intra-personal compromises, although intra-personal compromises are common even when they are not linked to inter-personal compromises. The main question addressed in the paper is whether the intra-personal…
Meta-Ethical Outlook on Animal Behaviours
Issue: Issue 21 • Author/s: Sanjit Chakraborty
Topics: Epistemology, Ethics, Metaethics, Moral Philosophy
The nominal ground that entwines human beings and animal behaviours is unwilling to admit moral valuing as a non-human act. Just to nail it down explicitly, two clauses ramify the moral conscience of human beings as follows: a) Can non-humans be moral beings?, b) Unconscious animal behaviours go beyond any moral judgments. My approach aims to rebuff these anthropomorphic clauses by justifying animals’ moral beings and animals’ moral behaviours from a meta-ethical stance. A meta-ethical outlook may enable an analysis of ethical and normative views through the limit of moral…