Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy

 

Age and Self-Knowledge

Issue: Issue 20 • Author/s: Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini
Topics: Epistemology, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action

This paper proposes an analysis of some possible implications of aging focusing the effects that aging may have on one’s self-knowledge. The goal of the paper is in fact to connect research on aging with different accounts of self-knowledge and put forward the following hypothesis: (i) in the late stages of our lives we adopt a different way of looking at ourselves, and (ii) there are three main factors likely causing this change: cognitive problems (episodic memory impairment), motivational factors (coherence-seeking), and loss of a forward-looking way of structuring our…

The History and Philosophy of Free Will: An Introduction [Topical Collection]

Issue: Issue 21 • Author/s: Sofia Bonicalzi, Mario De Caro
Topics: Epistemology, History of Philosophy, Introduction, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action

From Guilt to Responsibility: Ancient Theories of Action from Homer to Aristotle (plus Alexander of Aphrodisias) [Topical Collection]

Issue: Issue 21 • Author/s: Carlo Natali
Topics: Epistemology, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of action

In Greece, the problem of responsibility for choices was originally discussed by poets and legislators. Philosophical analysis developed in relation to these reflections, and Plato wanted to undermine the authority of poets with a new approach, inspired by Socrates. Aristotle tackled the question starting from Plato's position. His approach was not limited to the question of the responsibility of those who perform evil actions, but extends to a general evaluation of the entire sphere of human actions. The problem of responsibility in Aristotle is discussed on the basis of a…

Free Will in Leibniz’s Thought [Topical Collection]

Issue: Issue 21 • Author/s: Gianfranco Mormino
Topics: Epistemology, Ethics, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action

Since the beginning of his activity, Leibniz considers the notion of free will as absurd; he holds this notion not only unnecessary to found moral responsibility but also as an impediment to the correct understanding of divine and human retribution. What prevents many readers to accept this view is Leibniz's insistence on contingency as a requisite of free actions: I argue that the possibility of ‘being otherwise’ in a different possible world has nothing to do with freedom, which is a perfection, but rather explains the fact that our actions…

Locke on Free Will and Epistemic Responsibility [Topical Collection]

Issue: Issue 21 • Author/s: Samuel C. Rickless
Topics: Epistemology, Ethics, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action

This article summarizes John Locke’s considered views on freedom, explaining that freedom is a power of the mind to act in accordance with its volitions, that freedom is a power that can belong only to substances, that we have the freedom to will in many cases, including the power to hold our wills undetermined and thereby suspend the prosecution of our desires.  This is a seemingly reasonable account of how our minds work, and should work, when we make (important) decisions.  But Locke takes us to be morally responsible and…

Hume on Free Will [Topical Collection]

Issue: Issue 21 • Author/s: Lorenzo Greco
Topics: Epistemology, Ethics, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action

In this essay, I discuss David Hume’s reasoning on free will as he presents it in A Treatise of Human Nature and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. I proceed by showing how Hume’s compatibilist solution acquires meaning in the light of his sentimentally based science of human nature, which conceives human beings as reasonable, social, and active creatures. Within Hume’s empiricist, naturalistic, and sceptical approach, we deal only with perceptions and never with things themselves, and human experience is structured in a causal order which allows us to organise both…

Kant on Free Will [Topical Collection]

Issue: Issue 21 • Author/s: Derk Pereboom
Topics: Epistemology, Ethics, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action

For Kant transcendental freedom consists in the power of agents to produce actions without being causally determined by antecedent conditions in exercising this power. He contends that we cannot establish whether we are actually or even possibly free in this sense. Kant claims only that our conception of ourselves as transcendentally free involves no inconsistency, and that as a result the belief that we are free in this sense meets a relevant standard of minimal credibility. Justification of this belief ultimately depends on practical reasons: the need to believe that…

Hegel on Free Will [Topical Collection]

Issue: Issue 21 • Author/s: Thomas Meyer
Topics: Epistemology, Ethics, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action

In this essay I present Hegel’s philosophy of free will. Although free will plays a crucial role in Hegel's practical philosophy, freedom is also part of his philosophy of mind, his philosophy of nature, and his Science of Logic. After examining the philosophical motivations that led Hegel to create his system of philosophy, I will outline the basic concept of free will presented in the introduction to his Elements of the Philosophy of Right. This concept, however, still allows for free will skepticism, which motivates me to reconstruct the metaphysical…

Free Will: A Pseudo-Problem? Schlick on a Longstanding Metaphysical and Ethical Debate [Topical Collection]

Issue: Issue 21 • Author/s: Sofia Bonicalzi
Topics: Epistemology, Ethics, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action

Free will, famously described by David Hume as “the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science”, has long been a subject of intense debate, particularly regarding its compatibility with a deterministic universe and its implications for ethical questions, notably moral responsibility. Moritz Schlick, a leading figure in the Vienna Circle and the neopositivist movement, challenges the validity of this debate, asserting that it arises from linguistic and semantic confusions surrounding terms like ‘freedom’, ‘determinism’, and ‘will’. Reflecting the neopositivist disdain for metaphysics and normative ethics, Schlick posits that…

Virtue, Character, and Moral Responsibility: Against the Monolithic View

Issue: Issue 17 • Author/s: Giulia Luvisotto, Johannes Roessler
Topics: Ethics, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action, Theoretical philosophy

A traditional tenet of virtue ethics is that a proper moral assessment of an action needs to be informed by a view of the agent; in particular, a view of their virtues or vices, as exhibited in their action. This picture has been challenged on the grounds that it is revisionary and ill-motivated. The key claim is that we are ordinarily disposed to judge the moral merits of particular actions independently of any view of the character of the agent, and that there is nothing wrong with that practice. In this paper, we identify…
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