Issue: Issue 20 • Author/s: Jonathan Kaplan
Topics: Epistemology, Ontology, Philosophy of Biology, Philosophy of Medicine, Philosophy of Race, Philosophy of science
In this paper, I endorse the view defended by Hochman and others that there are no races but rather there are only racialized populations. The distinction between “race” being real but socially constructed and being its being non-existent or a ‘myth’ might seem of little importance. But aside from conceptual clarity, the view that there are only racialized populations makes better sense of how racialized populations came into being, how racialization has the profound impacts that it does, and what kind of worlds we might imagine (and work towards) where…
Issue: Issue 20 • Author/s: Azita Chellappoo
Topics: Epistemology, Philosophy of Biology, Philosophy of Medicine, Philosophy of Race, Philosophy of science
Debates over the use of racial categories in medicine have, thus far, been largely focused on cases and considerations occurring in the United States. However, race is used in medical settings in many places outside the US. I argue that the US focus leads to important limitations in our ability to understand and intervene on issues of race in medicine in other areas of the world. I draw on work from metaphysics of race debates to indicate why transnational continuities and discontinuities in race present a problem for US focused…
Issue: Issue 20 • Author/s: Fabio Bacchini
Topics: Epistemology, Ontology, Philosophy of Biology, Philosophy of language, Philosophy of Medicine, Philosophy of Race
In this paper I reconstruct Spencer (2014)’s argument supporting the conclusion that ‘race’, in its current U.S. meaning, is a rigidly designating proper name for a biologically real entity, specifically for the partition at the K = 5 level of human population structure. Then, I object to the argument by contesting three distinct key assertions in it. First, I contest the assumption that if a term t has a logically inconsistent set of identifying conditions but a robust extension, then it is appropriate to identify the meaning of t as…
Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Francesca Bellazzi
Topics: Metaphysics, Ontology, Philosophy of Biology, Philosophy of language, Philosophy of Medicine, Philosophy of science
This paper will consider how the account of weak emergence presented by Wilson in the book Metaphysical emergence (2021) can be used to explore the relation between biochemical functions and chemical structure in biochemical molecules, as vitamin B12. The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 will introduce why biochemical functions are interesting from a philosophical perspective and why their relation to molecular structure can be seen as problematic. In doing so, it will consider the definition of biochemical functions as in Bellazzi (2022) for which they can…
Issue: Issue 20 • Author/s: Alfonso Muñoz-Corcuera
Topics: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ontology, Philosophy of Biology, Philosophy of mind
One of the primary objections to the biological approach revolves around what is known as the transplant intuition. That is, the allegedly widely shared intuition that if we had our cerebrum transplanted into a different body, we would be transferred to that body along with our cerebrum. Drawing upon our understanding of brain death, this paper argues that either (1) the transplant intuition should be rejected, and the biological approach has the advantage of being consistent with that rejection; or (2) the psychological approach, the biological approach’s main rival, cannot…