The Fission Argument for the Unimportance of Identity Cannot Be Correct [Article Discussion]
Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Harold Noonan
Topics: Metaphysics, Ontology, Philosophy of mind, Theoretical philosophy
Eric Olson has made an important addition to the discussion started by Parfit of the argument from the possibility of fission to the unimportance of personal identity. Olson’s discussion is challenging. I want, more briefly, to highlight what is the most important consequence of it. This is that it is metaphysically impossible, impossible in the strongest sense, that any version of Parfit’s argument from fission can yield his conclusion. Olson argues specifically that this is impossible if what he calls a ‘capacious ontology’ is assumed. I argue that it is…
Is What Matters Present in a Fission Scenario? A Conventionalist Response to Noonan [Article Discussion]
Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Alfonso Muñoz-Corcuera
Topics: Metaphysics, Ontology, Philosophy of mind, Theoretical philosophy
In a recent paper, Olson (2019) returned to Parfit’s argument from the possibility of fission to the unimportance of identity to claim that it is inconsistent with Parfit’s ontological commitments. Picking up Olson’s claim, Noonan (2024) argues that one consequence of this is that Parfit’s argument necessarily fails to yield its conclusion. Here I show that Noonan’s ontological stance is similar to Parfit's in one significant sense, thus diminishing the scope of his claim. As a result, I hold that if we want to defend that personal identity is what…
I Don’t Feel like That! A Phenomenology-Free Approach to Moods
Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Daniele Cassaghi
Topics: Epistemology, Philosophy of mind, Theoretical philosophy
People in moods usually claim that they feel in a certain way, and yet they also say that moods are undirected states. If one takes these reports at face value, moods are a counterexample to representationalism, namely the doctrine of a necessary connection between phenomenal character and content. The standard representationalist answer is to deny moods’ undirectedness in order to capture the phenomenal character of moods. I go in the opposite direction: I will deny moods’ phenomenal character and secure moods’ undirectedness instead. I will show that both our folk-psychological…
Charity and Altruism: Rational Requirements for Action
Issue: Issue 20 • Author/s: Caterina Di Maio
Topics: Epistemology, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action, Philosophy of mind
This paper discusses the possibility of altruism based on the linguistic, and then practical notion of charity, to distinguish it from psychological and ethical selfishness. My starting hypothesis is, as Thomas Nagel argued, that altruism could be interpreted as a rational requirement for action. This hypothesis arises from a specific approach in analytical philosophy to the problem of explaining action, which combines the concepts of charity and altruism in a single interpretative framework about others. My aim is to present a common thread linking the thought of Willard Van Orman…
The Transplant Intuition as an Argument for the Biological Approach
Issue: Issue 20 • Author/s: Alfonso Muñoz-Corcuera
Topics: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ontology, Philosophy of Biology, Philosophy of mind
One of the primary objections to the biological approach revolves around what is known as the transplant intuition. That is, the allegedly widely shared intuition that if we had our cerebrum transplanted into a different body, we would be transferred to that body along with our cerebrum. Drawing upon our understanding of brain death, this paper argues that either (1) the transplant intuition should be rejected, and the biological approach has the advantage of being consistent with that rejection; or (2) the psychological approach, the biological approach’s main rival, cannot…
Liberal Naturalism, Human Sciences, and Psychoanalysis
Issue: Issue 20 • Author/s: Ricardo Navia
Topics: Epistemology, Meta-Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of mind
In this text I intend to show to what extent a certain epistemological understanding of psychoanalysis (fundamentally Freudian) finds parallels with the so-called liberalization process of epistemological naturalism. My thesis is that the sui generis epistemological modalities created by Freud not only coincide with this process, but to a significant degree were precursors of the methodological and ontological innovations that LN (liberal naturalism) proposes to defend and theorize. I begin by reviewing the process of liberalization of epistemic naturalism, from a predominantly physicalist model to a liberal version that takes…