Fiction and Imagination as Grounds for Counterfactual Reasoning, Scientific Modeling, and Thought Experiments
Carola Barbero, Matteo Plebani, Alberto Voltolini
Invited contributors: Frederick Kroon, Arnon Levy, Fiora Salis
Deadline for submission: April 30th, 2020
Notification of acceptance: July 30, 2020
In recent times, a huge debate has arisen as to the role of imagination, especially in its relation with fiction, in shaping modal, philosophical, and scientific reasoning. Counterfactual discourse involves the consideration of unreal scenarios, whether possible or even impossible. Both philosophy and science make reference to thought experiments, which seems to be like short fictional stories. And scientific models may be compared with games of make-believe, insofar as the latter mobilize physical objects as props for imaginary characters. In this special issue, we want to primarily address the following topics:
- Does fiction mobilize some specific form of imagination?
- Is there a real divide between fictional and nonfictional works?
- In what sense does imagination support counterfactual reasoning?
- Is practical reasoning counterfactual reasoning?
- Are thought experiments a form of fictional narration?
- Are scientific models really related to pretence play?
Articles must be written in English and should not exceed 8000 words. For the presentation of their articles, authors are requested to take into account the instructions available under Information for Authors. Submissions must be suitable for blind review. Each submission should also include a brief abstract of no more than 250 words and four keywords for indexing purposes. Notification of intent to submit, including both a title and a brief summary of the content, will be greatly appreciated, as it will assist with the coordination and planning of the special issue.