

Naïve Realism and the Explanatory Role of Visual Phenomenology

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Abstract

This paper argues that naïve realism has an epistemic advantage over other rival views. The argument consists of two steps. First, I argue that the phenomenology of veridical visual experience plays an indispensable role in explaining how we can refer to the experience as a justificatory reason for a demonstrative judgment. Second, I argue that only naïve realism can coherently allow a veridical visual experience to be used as a factive reason.

Keywords: Naïve Realism, Factive Reason, Perceptual Experience, Visual Phenomenology, Introspection.

1. Naïve Realism

Naïve realism can be characterized as a conjunction of two claims, one explanatory and one metaphysical. The explanatory claim is that the phenomenology of veridical visual experience is *explained by* acquaintance (or perception), an irreducible mental relation between a subject and environmental objects. That is to say, a veridical experience has visual phenomenology in virtue of *its acquainting the subject with environmental objects (or the subject's perceiving environmental objects)*, rather than *its representing such objects* or *its acquainting the subject with private mental entities*.¹ I call the property of *acquainting the subject with environmental objects* the 'naïve realist property'.² This explanatory claim is insufficient by itself in that it does not address the metaphysics of visual phenomenology. Given this, naïve realists, such as Campbell and Logue, add the metaphysical claim that the visual phenomenology of veridical experience is wholly constituted by environ-

¹ According to this characterization, the following figures can be regarded as naïve realists: Bill Brewer (2011), John Campbell (2002a), Mike Martin (2004, 2006), Mark Johnston (2004, 2006), William Fish (2009), Matthew Kennedy (2013) and Logue (2012a, 2012b).

² Throughout this paper, I use "see" and "perceive" in the factive sense that when we see or perceive X, then X exists.

mental objects and their properties, with which the subject is acquainted.³ Hence, I characterize naïve realism as the conjunction of these explanatory and metaphysical claims.

Given that the phenomenology of experience is usually regarded as *a property* of experience, one may wonder if it is a category-mistake to think that the phenomenology of veridical experience is constituted by environmental objects and their properties. There is, however, a conception of visual phenomenology that does not presuppose that it is a property of experience. William Fish introduced a notion of presentational character, which is “the array of features that we are presented with [in having an experience] and that characterize what it is like to have that experience”.⁴ In his characterization, it is left open what metaphysical status the presentational character has. That is, the features in question can be of environmental object, private mental entity, intentional object or experience itself. I characterize the phenomenology of visual experience in terms of its presentational character. Hence, this characterization opens the possibility that the phenomenology of veridical experience is constituted by environmental objects and their properties.

A large number of studies have been made on the viability of naïve realism, but as Logue pointed out, little attention has been given to the motivations of naïve realism.⁵ Why should we adopt naïve realism? Among others, one popular idea is that naïve realism best captures the explanatory roles of the phenomenology of veridical experience. The aim of this paper is to develop and defend this idea.

2. The Explanatory Role of Visual Phenomenology

The first question that needs to be asked is, what explanatory roles does the visual phenomenology of veridical experience have? The following is a list of potential explanatory roles.

- (1) Demonstrative Thought: the phenomenology of veridical experience plays a role in explaining how it is possible to demonstratively think about an environmental object.
- (2) Concept of Perceptible Properties: the phenomenology of veridical experience plays a role in explaining how we acquire certain concepts of perceptible properties such as redness and roundness.
- (3) Knowledge about the Nature of Perceptible Properties: the phenomenology of veridical experience plays a role in explaining how we acquire knowledge about the nature of perceptible properties such as redness and roundness.
- (4) Knowledge of our Surrounding Environment: the phenomenology of veridical experience plays a role in explaining how we acquire knowledge of our surrounding environment such as the knowledge that there is a bottle of whiskey in front of me.

Naïve realists maintain that naïve realism best captures all or some of these explanatory roles. The opponents of naïve realism can object to this claim in two different ways. One way is to argue that a certain theory other than naïve

³ Campbell 2002a; Logue 2012b.

⁴ Fish 2009: 15.

⁵ Logue 2012b.

realism can also sufficiently capture the explanatory roles. The other way is to argue that the visual phenomenology of veridical experience does not play any such explanatory roles. Naïve realists provide detailed arguments against the first type of objection.⁶ In this paper, I do not discuss this type of objection. What I focus on here is the second type of objection. Indeed, naïve realists tend to simply assume, without sufficient arguments, that the visual phenomenology of veridical experience plays such explanatory roles. For instance, Heather Logue and Thomas Raleigh respectively claim:

Why should we think that the phenomenal character of veridical experience ever puts us in [a position to know something of what things are like independently of experience]? My response is to turn the tables—why shouldn't we think this?⁷

I assume that a subject's conscious experience of O can play a role in allowing the subject to demonstratively refer to O.⁸

Such assumptions seem plausible from the first-person perspective. When reflecting on my cognitive life, it seems to be the case that I actually employ the visual phenomenology of veridical experience in order to form demonstrative thoughts and acquire various kinds of knowledge and certain concepts. First, consider a case in which I see a red apple and then form a demonstrative judgment that this is red (and further suppose that the judgment counts as knowledge). It seems to me that what I would do in that case is, roughly speaking, to pay attention to the red-apple-phenomenology of the experience and then apply the demonstrative concept *this* and the colour concept *red* to the phenomenology. Second, consider a case in which I am seeing a red apple but it is my first time seeing a red object. It seems to me that I would acquire the concept of *red* by attending to the red-apple-phenomenology if I am in an appropriate context. Likewise, it seems to me that I would come to know an essential aspect of redness by attending to the red-apple-phenomenology if I am in an appropriate context. If these considerations are correct, the phenomenology of veridical experience plays an important role in making demonstrative judgments and acquiring relevant knowledge and concepts. It is this first-person reflection that makes it apparently reasonable to assume that visual phenomenology has such explanatory roles.

Nevertheless, the fact that such an assumption seems plausible from the first-person perspective does not mean that it is indeed true. Although the first-person reflection may give a positive evidence for such an assumption, it is not decisive. To deny such an assumption is to endorse the view that the phenomenology of veridical experience is explanatorily impotent. I call it the “impotence view”.

In order to justify the impotence view, its advocates may claim that introspection is not a reliable tool to know the nature of our cognitive activities. It is standard in cognitive science to think that “[common sense and introspection]

⁶ For the first and second explanatory roles, see Campbell 2002a, 2002b, 2011. Thomas Raleigh (2011) also provides a plausible argument implicitly suggesting that naïve realism alone can capture the first explanatory role. For the third explanatory role, see Logue 2012b. For the fourth one, see Johnston 2006, 2011.

⁷ Logue 2012b: 231.

⁸ Raleigh 2011: 174.

can give a misleading picture of mental operations".⁹ This idea is supported by the fact that we are surprised by various mental phenomena such as change blindness or inattention blindness.¹⁰ Taking this into account, it seems inappropriate to swallow everything that first-person reflection tells us as to how we perform cognitive activities on faith. This consideration in itself does not provide a positive evidence for the impotence view, but it casts a doubt on the first-person reflection suggesting that we actually utilize the phenomenology of veridical experience to perform various cognitive activities. Unless there is some additional support for the reliability of first-person reflection in the given cases, advocates of impotence view claim, the suggestion is not justified. If we should not trust the first-person reflection, then there seems to be no negative evidence for the impotence view.

Perhaps, advocates of the impotence view may further claim that there is a positive evidence for it. One strategy is to appeal to the undoubted fact that cognitive psychology as a scientific approach to human mind has largely succeeded.¹¹ It is generally accepted that cognitive psychology has successfully provided elaborate accounts of various mental phenomena such as memory, object-recognition and attention. Given this, it seems reasonable to posit a working hypothesis that cognitive psychology can, in principle, provide plausible accounts of relevant cognitive and epistemic activities such as forming demonstrative judgments and acquiring various types of concepts and knowledge. First, it seems possible to explain how we form a demonstrative thought in terms of perceptual-recognition systems and its causal connection to an environmental object. Second, in developmental psychology, there are some theories of concept acquisition. Third, cognitive psychological theories as to how we are able to visually recognize and identify a colour may produce a plausible answer to the question of how we can know what a colour is. Here, it is important to note that the phenomenal aspect of perceptual experience would not be mentioned in such scientific explanations. That is to say, it seems plausible to think that we can adequately explain the aforementioned cognitive activities without reference to the phenomenology of perceptual experience. Based on this, advocates of the impotence view may claim that the phenomenology of perceptual experience has no role in explaining such cognitive activities.

However, this argument fails. Even if cognitive psychology can provide an account of cognitive activity without reference to the phenomenology of perceptual experience, it does not mean that the phenomenology has no role in our performing the cognitive activity. The first-person descriptions of how we perform a cognitive activity can be regarded as a sort of account of the cognitive activity from the first-person perspective. Such an account seems to be compatible with any cognitive psychological explanation of the same activity. Suppose that we can provide accounts of digestion from both biological perspective and physiological perspective. Although these accounts are about the same digestive process and different in many respects, they are not incompatible. Rather, it seems that they complement each other. Likewise, the first-person account of a cognitive activity and the cognitive psychological account of it are different, at least,

⁹ Thagard 2010: Section 2.

¹⁰ For change blindness and inattention blindness, see the Simons Lab Website (<http://www.simonslab.com/videos.html>).

¹¹ For cognitive psychology in general, see Gazzaniga, Ivry and Mangun 2013.

in the presence or absence of reference to the phenomenology of perceptual experience, but they can be compatible. Unless some argument against this compatibility is provided, it is reasonable to think that the cognitive psychological account of a cognitive activity does not exclude the phenomenological account of it. Rather, they seem to complement each other. Hence, the idea that cognitive psychology can provide an account of the aforementioned cognitive activities does not support the impotence view.

Instead of appealing to cognitive psychology, advocates of the impotence view may appeal to the possibility of the philosophical zombie. Philosophical zombies, who are cognitively the same as us but lack phenomenal consciousness, are regarded as conceivable. If philosophical zombies can perform a cognitive activity, the explanation as to how they perform it must not involve any reference to phenomenology. This suggests that it is unnecessary to mention the phenomenology of experience in order to explain how we, not philosophical zombies but conscious subjects, perform the same cognitive activity. Because philosophical zombies are completely the same as us in all cognitive aspects, the phenomenology of veridical experience would be unnecessary to explain the aforementioned cognitive activities. Therefore, if we accept that the conceivability of philosophical zombie leads to its metaphysical possibility, then we should accept the impotence view.

However, this argument is ineffective. The disagreement between naïve realists and advocates of the impotence view consists in whether the phenomenal aspect of experience is independent of its cognitive aspect. Naïve realists answer in the negative; the advocates of the impotence view answer in the affirmative. Since the possibility of philosophical zombie depends on the idea that the phenomenal and cognitive aspects of experience are independent, naïve realists can object to this argument by contending that it is question-begging to assume that philosophical zombie is metaphysically possible.

These considerations demonstrate that there is neither positive nor negative evidence for the impotence view. On the one hand, Naïve realists draw upon the first-person reflection by which it is shown that the phenomenology of veridical experience plays a role in explaining certain cognitive activities; advocates of impotence view plausibly argue that such a reflection is unreliable. On the other hand, advocates of the impotence view may claim that the general success of cognitive psychology and the conceivability of philosophical zombie support the impotence view; naïve realists can plausibly deny the claim. This dispute seems to lead to the philosophical stalemate that is characterized as follows. Naïve realists and advocates of the impotence view have opposite intuitions. On the one hand, naïve realists have the intuition that first-person reflection must be respected, but the advocates of the impotence view do not have it. On the other hand, advocates of the impotence view have the intuition that the phenomenal aspect of a perceptual experience is metaphysically independent of its cognitive aspect, but naïve realists do not have it. Since their starting points are different, it is impossible to meaningfully develop this discussion. In order to avoid such a philosophical stalemate, naïve realists need to construct an argument against the impotence view without appealing to first-person reflection. In section 3, I will argue, without drawing on first-person reflection, that there is at least one explanatory role of the phenomenology of veridical experience we have a good reason to accept. Then, in section 4, I will discuss whether naïve realism can be promoted by appealing to the explanatory role.

3. Introspection and Phenomenology

It is generally accepted that we can refer to a perceptual experience as a justificatory reason for a demonstrative judgment. Let us consider the case in which I see a red apple in front of me in good daylight and then form the judgment that this apple is red. In this case, I can introspect on the veridical visual experience and then refer to it as a justificatory reason for the judgment. However, it is not the case that all visual states can be accessed via introspection. Note that there are various sub-personal visual states. Consider the case in which I am in a sub-personal visual state of *processing low level visual information*. Such a sub-personal visual state cannot be accessed by introspection.

What makes a difference in introspective accessibility? One plausible idea is that the difference consists in the presence or absence of distinctive phenomenology.¹² A perceptual experience is introspectively accessible because it has distinctive phenomenology. A sub-personal visual state is introspectively inaccessible because it does not have distinctive phenomenology. Nevertheless, it seems implausible to think that if a *mental state* is introspectively accessible, then it has distinct phenomenology. Beliefs may be a counterexample to this conditional statement, since they are usually regarded as introspectively accessible but seemingly do not have distinctive phenomenology.¹³ Given this, I restrict the scope of discussion to perceptual state. Thus, my claim is that a *perceptual experience* is introspectively accessible in virtue of having distinctive phenomenology. I call this the “phenomenal introspective principle”. It follows from this principle that the phenomenology of veridical experience plays an indispensable role in explaining how we can justify a demonstrative judgment by introspecting on a perceptual experience. I call this the “phenomenal justification view”.

The phenomenal introspective principle is supported by first-person reflection. Let us consider a case in which I refer to a veridical visual experience of a red object, via introspection, as a reason for the demonstrative judgment that this apple is red. When reflecting on what I would do in such a case, it seems that I first attend to the red-apple-phenomenology of the experience, and then come to know that the experience can be utilized as a justificatory reason for the judgment. Moreover, in the conceivable case in which the experience is deprived of its phenomenology, I have no idea how I can know, via introspection, that the experience is useful for justifying the judgment. In light of this first-person reflection, the phenomenal introspective principle seems plausible.

As we have seen, however, advocates of the impotence view have objected to the reliability of first-person reflection. If naïve realists cannot produce an additional support for the phenomenal introspective principle, the dialectical situation does not change. In the rest of this section, I construct an argument for the principle without appealing to first-person reflection.

First, I will illuminate the important difference between the cognitive activities directed towards the external world and the ones directed towards perceptual experience. The cognitive activities to form a demonstrative thought and to

¹² A similar idea is proposed by Smithies (2012, 2014). But his argument for the idea is different from mine.

¹³ This is controversial. Advocates of cognitive phenomenology may claim that beliefs are introspectively accessible in virtue of being related to distinctive phenomenology (Smithies 2014). For the disputes over cognitive phenomenology, see Bayne and Montague 2011.

acquire knowledge of our surrounding environment are directed towards *the external world*. Likewise, the cognitive abilities to acquire concepts of perceptible properties and knowledge about the nature of perceptible properties are directed towards properties that are instantiated in the *external world*. Even if perceptual experience is involved in the processes of these world-directed cognitive activities, they are not directed towards perceptual experience itself. In contrast, the cognitive activity to introspectively access one's own perceptual experience is obviously directed towards *perceptual experience itself*. It is implausible that the external world consists of the phenomenology of perceptual experience. It is also very doubtful that perceptible properties which can be instantiated in the external world consist of the phenomenology of perceptual experience.¹⁴ Then again, it is plausible that a perceptual experience partly consists of its phenomenology. Although perceptual experience has not only phenomenal aspect but also other various aspects such as psychological and functional aspects, it is standard to think that the distinctive and essential feature of perceptual experience is having visual phenomenology. Hence, we can plausibly assume that our perceptual experience partly consists of its phenomenology. I call it the "phenomenal constitution principle". On one hand, the world-directed cognitive activities are directed toward the entities that do not consist of the phenomenology of perceptual experience. On the other hand, introspection is directed toward a perceptual experience, the components of which includes visual phenomenology. This difference is crucial for my argument.

Second, I shall point out that there is a conceptual connection between phenomenal experience and introspective access to it. It is unintelligible that I, as a lucid and attentive subject, am undergoing a phenomenal experience, but I am not in a position to know what it is like to have the experience.¹⁵ If this were the case, we would have no idea what the concept of *phenomenology* and its cognates refer(s) to. Assuming that we actually have the concept of phenomenology, therefore, it is reasonable to accept the following principle: if one has a perceptual experience, then he/she is in a position to introspectively know about its phenomenology. I call this the "accessible phenomenology principle".¹⁶ In cases where it is unintelligible that X occurs but Y does not occur, it is plausible to think that X conceptually involves Y. Hence, it is plausible to think that the reason why the accessible phenomenology principle is true lies in the conceptual connection between phenomenal experience and introspective access to it. Hence, I plausibly assume that the accessible phenomenology principle is a conceptual truth.

The conjunction of the phenomenal constitution principle and the accessible phenomenology principle leads to the view that we can get access to a perceptual experience via the introspective access to its phenomenology. Assuming that the justificatory aspect and phenomenal aspect of perceptual experience are connected in such a way that the justificatory aspect is made available via the introspective access to the phenomenal aspect, it follows from that view that we

¹⁴ However, it is not implausible that the phenomenology of perceptual experience consists of perceptible properties. The relation *consisting of* is asymmetrical.

¹⁵ Horgan and Kriegel 2007 and Butler 2013 (section 4) pushed the same point.

¹⁶ This does not mean that the introspective access to a phenomenal experience is infallible. The accessible phenomenal principle is different from the principle that if one has a phenomenal experience, then he/she *knows* what it is like to have it.

can refer to a perceptual experience as a justificatory reason via the introspective access to its phenomenology. This entails the phenomenal justification view that the phenomenology of veridical experience plays an indispensable role in explaining how we can justify a demonstrative judgment by introspecting on a perceptual experience.

How to conceive of the connection between the phenomenal and justificatory aspects of perceptual experience depends on each theory of perceptual experience. In the next section, I will give a naïve realist account of this connection. Here, it might be claimed that it is impossible for any view that those aspects are connected in a suitable manner. However, the burden of proof for this extremely strong claim lies with such opponents. To the best of my knowledge, there is no theory-neutral argument showing the impossibility of the justificatory-phenomenal connection. Furthermore, the opponents need to clarify how we can refer to a perceptual experience as a justificatory reason for a demonstrative judgment without appealing to the introspective access to its phenomenology. At the very least, this is a difficult task. Given these considerations, it is reasonable to conclude that the conjunction of the phenomenal constitution principle and the accessible phenomenology principle leads to the phenomenal justification view.

What is important is that this argument does not rely on the first-person reflection on how we refer to a perceptual experience as a justificatory reason. The phenomenal constitution principle is derived from the plausible conception of the metaphysical relation between perceptual experience and its phenomenology; the accessible phenomenology principle is derived from the conceptual connection between phenomenal experience and introspective access to it. Thus, even if first-person reflection were to be generally unreliable, it would have no effect on this argument. It is also important to note that the same line of argumentation cannot be used to show that the phenomenology of perceptual experience plays a role in explaining other *world-directed* cognitive activities, such as forming demonstrative thought and acquiring knowledge of our surrounding environment. This is because the phenomenal constitution principle does not hold for such cognitive activities.

In this section, I have defended the phenomenal justification view. In the next section, I will discuss whether or not this view promotes naïve realism.

4. Introspectively Accessible Factive Reason

Recall that the metaphysical claim of naïve realism is that the visual phenomenology of veridical experience is wholly constituted by environmental objects and their properties, with which the subject is acquainted. As Johnston and Fish emphasized, the structured couples of environmental objects and perceptible properties are plausibly regarded as *truth makers* of demonstrative judgments.¹⁷ Suppose that I see a red apple and form the demonstrative judgment that this apple is red. What makes this judgment true is the structured couple of the perceived apple and its redness, such as the apple being red or the apple having the red trope. It is plausible that we can justify a judgment by referring to its truth maker. Thus, naïve realists can reasonably claim that we can justify a demonstrative judgment by referring to the phenomenology of a veridical experience.

¹⁷ Johnston 2006, Fish 2009.

However, some theories other than naïve realism arguably allow a perceptual experience to be used as a justificatory reason for a demonstrative judgment. According to Kriegel and Horgan and Tienson, the phenomenology of perceptual experience is representational in the sense that perceptual experience has representational content in virtue of having phenomenology.¹⁸ This view is called “phenomenology-first intentionalism”.¹⁹ Moreover, some representationists, such as Chalmers and Brogaard, claim that the phenomenology of perceptual experience is identical to its content which is represented in a certain manner.²⁰ Following Chalmers, I call this view “impure representationalism”.²¹ On these views, it is plausible to think that the introspective access to the phenomenology of perceptual experience makes it possible for us to use its representational content as a justificatory reason. Hence, these views can arguably accept the phenomenal justification view.²²

With respect to perceptual justification, the distinctive feature of naïve realism is that it can allow a perceptual experience to be used as a *factive* reason. A reason whose content is that O is P is factive if and only if the fact that we have the reason entails that O is P. For instance, seeing the structured couple of O and P entails that O is P. Hence, when we use the visual state of *seeing the structured couple of O and P* as a justificatory reason, the reason is factive. Naïve realists can maintain that we can use a perceptual experience as a factive justificatory reason for a demonstrative judgment. This is because if the phenomenology of a veridical experience is constituted by the structured couple of O and P, then the fact that we are undergoing the phenomenology entails that O is P.

In contrast, the phenomenology-first intentionalists and the impure representationists cannot allow a perceptual experience to be used as a factive reason. This is because such theorists usually accept the common factor principle that the phenomenal aspects of a veridical visual experience and an introspectively indiscriminable hallucinatory experience are the same. Consider a case in which I have a veridical visual experience whose representational content is that O is P. Going by phenomenology-first intentionalism, this case is characterized as follows: I am undergoing the phenomenology that grounds the representational content that O is P. According to impure representationalism, this case is, roughly speaking, characterized as follows: I am undergoing the phenomenology that is identical to the representational content that O is P. Given the common factor principle, however, such theorists would accept that a corresponding hallucinatory experience can have the same phenomenology even though it is not the case that O is P. This means that the fact that I am undergoing the said phenomenology does not entail that O is P. According to phenomenology-first

¹⁸ Kriegel 2007, Horgan and Tienson 2002.

¹⁹ Fish 2010: 67-68.

²⁰ Chalmers 2004, Brogaard 2010.

²¹ Chalmers 2004.

²² It might be disputable whether the representational content of perceptual experience, which is based on or identical to its phenomenology, can be adequately justificatory of *demonstrative* judgments. This is because it might be suspected that such representational content cannot contain demonstrative elements which can pick out external objects. I set this issue aside and assume that such representational content can be somehow justificatory of demonstrative judgments. Given that the aim of this section is to show the advantage of naïve realism over other views, this assumption accords with the principle of charity.

intentionalism and impure representationalism, hence, we cannot use the phenomenology of veridical experience as a factive justificatory reason for the judgment that O is P.²³

The question to be asked here is, why do we need a factive reason? Whether naïve realism is promoted by adopting the phenomenal justification view depends on the answer to this question. If there is a good reason for allowing a perceptual experience to be used as a factive reason, then we can motivate the adoption of naïve realism.

According to Duncan Pritchard²⁴, we should embrace introspectively accessible factive reason for two reasons. The first reason is that we can best capture our commonsense about everyday justificatory practices by appealing to introspectively accessible factive reason.²⁵ The second reason is that we can effectively block radical skepticism by appealing to it.²⁶ However, these reasons have been criticized by Smithies.²⁷ His objection to the first reason is, roughly speaking, that our commonsense on such a topic is so complicated that it is difficult to draw a clear evidence for a particular epistemological theory from it. His objection to the second reason is that there are many theories that can block radical skepticism without appealing to factive reason as effectively as naïve realists do. It might be possible to develop and refine Pritchard's argument so as to avoid Smithies objections. Since I agree with Smithies objections, however, I would like to look for another reason.

William Alston maintains that what epistemic activities aim for is nothing less than *truth*.²⁸ That is to say, the aim of our epistemic activities is to form *true* judgments or beliefs. As Alston points out, there are various kinds of epistemic desiderata.²⁹ Where X is a feature of a judgment, X is epistemically desirable if X is the sign showing that the judgment is true or likely to be true. For example, it is epistemically desirable that a judgment is formed by a sufficiently reliable judgment-forming process, and that a subject has adequate evidence for a judgment.³⁰ Though Alston does not explicitly mention, it is unquestionable that it is epistemically desirable to have a factive reason for a judgment. My suggestion is that having a factive reason is *in itself* a distinct epistemic desideratum. Whether we need such a reason in order to effectively block radical skepticism is not essential for its epistemic value. Whether we need such a reason in order to acquire knowledge is not essential as well. In my opinion, the reason why we

²³ Even representationalists, such as Dretske and Tye, who claim that veridical visual experience has de-re or singular content, accept the common factor principle (Dretske 1995: 101-102, Tye 2009: 115-16). This means that they are committed to the idea that the *part* of representational content of perceptual experience which is regarded as identical to its phenomenology is common in veridical and hallucinatory experiences. If *the very part* of representational content can be justificatory of demonstrative judgments, they can accept the phenomenal justification view. Nevertheless, as long as the part of representational content is common in veridical and hallucinatory experiences, they cannot allow a veridical visual experience to be used as a factive reason.

²⁴ Pritchard 2012.

²⁵ Ibid: 17-18.

²⁶ Ibid: 110-52.

²⁷ Smithies 2013.

²⁸ Alston 2005: 29.

²⁹ Ibid: 39-57.

³⁰ Ibid: 43.

should embrace the idea of factive reason is that it is *in itself* epistemically desirable to have a factive reason. Since having a factive reason for a judgment entails the truth of the judgment, it is one of the most desirable things from the epistemic point of view to have a factive reason. This indicates that it is epistemically much better to admit that a perceptual experience can be used as a factive reason than otherwise.

However, there is a potential objection to this line of argument for naïve realism. Suppose that a veridical experience is introspectively indiscriminable from a hallucinatory experience. According to naïve realism, these experiences provide us with different kinds of reasons for our judgments. The introspective access to the phenomenology of veridical experience makes it possible for us to use the experience as a factive reason for a demonstrative judgment. In contrast, introspection does not make it possible for us to use a hallucinatory experience as such a factive reason. At best, it can be used as a non-factive reason for a demonstrative judgment. Nevertheless, we cannot be introspectively aware of the rational difference between these experiences, for these are introspectively indiscriminable. However, it seems intuitively plausible that if we have a reason in one case and a different reason in the other, then we should be introspectively aware of the rational difference between the two cases. Hence, even if it is epistemically better to admit that a veridical experience can be used as a factive reason, it costs too much because it leads to the implausible consequence that we cannot be introspectively aware of the rational difference between a veridical experience and the corresponding hallucinatory experience.

Due to the space constraints, I cannot discuss this objection to the necessary extent. I just sketch my basic idea of how naïve realists can avoid it. The objection has been described by using three notions: *introspective indiscriminability*, *introspective access* and *introspective awareness*. It is obscure what exactly these notions respectively mean. Perhaps, the word “introspective” has different senses in each notion; the objection may rely on the equivocality of “introspective”. If this is correct, naïve realists would be able to dissolve the objection by analysing these notions in detail. In my opinion, if we would like to promote naïve realism by appealing to introspectively accessible factive reason, what we should engage in is the attempt to analyse various notions containing the word “introspective” or its cognates.

5. Conclusion

I have discussed how we can promote naïve realism by appealing to the explanatory roles of the phenomenology of veridical visual experience. I have argued for the phenomenal justification view (without appealing to first-person reflection). Given the phenomenal justification view, I have then argued that only naïve realism can coherently allow a veridical visual experience to be used as a *factive* reason.³¹ This can be regarded as one theoretical advantage of naïve realism.

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