Proper Names as Demonstratives

Maciej Tarnowski

University of Warsaw

Abstract

The paper considers the hypothesis that proper names are simple demonstratives. In the first part, I provide the general motivation for an indexical treatment of proper names as well as assess the strengths and weaknesses of existing indexical accounts. The second part is devoted to proposing a new account that treats proper names as simple demonstratives, where referents are determined by the speaker's referential intention. In my proposal, I use the hybrid approach toward indexical expressions developed by Wolfgang Künne (1992) and Stefano Predelli (2006). I argue that this approach allows countering many of the problems haunting existing indexical accounts of proper names. I also consider the two possible objections: the Humpty-Dumpty objection to intentionalism regarding demonstrative reference (Gorvett 2005) and García-Carpintero's (2018) argument against indexicalism from misdescription of linguistic competence of proper name users. I show how the proposed approach may counter them. The considerations concerning this problem also demonstrate how the treatment of proper names as hybrid demonstratives may allow solving the problems posed by the "Madagascar argument" to the causal-chain theory of proper name reference (Evans 1973) as well as explain the presence of predicative uses of proper names in natural language (Burge 1973).

Keywords: Proper names, Demonstratives, Hybrid expressions, Intention.

Proper names serve as a long finger of ostension over time and place.
Barcan Marcus (1986: 122)

1. Motivation for Indexical Treatment of Proper Names

In recent years there has been a substantial number of proposals treating proper names as a class of indexicals (see Recanati 1993; Pelczar & Rainsbury 1998; Rami 2014), which aim at accommodating the directly referential nature of proper names (Kripke 1972) and the explanation of "proper name ambiguity" or "nambiguity" (Korta, Perry 2011), which troubles many classic proposals of semantic analysis of proper name reference, such as Kripkean causal chain theory. The phenomenon of nambiguity may be captured by appealing to the intuitive notion of "name-sharing": we are inclined to say, for example, that there are at least two

Argumenta (2022): 55-71
ISSN 2465-2334

DOI 10.14275/2465-2334/202200.tar

people named 'Alfred' who deserve wide recognition for their contribution to mathematical logic, or that in the past year 'Michael' was the most popular male name in the United States. As an example, we may consider the following statement (Korta & Perry 2011: 75):

(1) If John would quiet down, John could hear what John is saying

where each token of 'John' is intended to refer to a different individual at some meeting. Intuitively, all three mentioned individuals share a property: "being called 'John'". According to traditional views on proper name semantics, this claim, however, should be regarded as false or metaphorical.[1] According to a causal chain theorist, every token of the word 'John' in (1) is a token of a different name-type identified by its causal history. Proper names as types however, *contra* causal chain theorist, do not seem to be tied to a particular individual. It is even more visible in cases where the use of a proper name is preceded by a quantifier or pluralised, as in:

(2) Every John I met during this visit was nice to me.

(3) There are several Johns in the room right now.

After Burge (1973), many (e.g., Bach 2002) regard this observation as an argument for a different treatment of proper names as metalinguistic predicates. Such treatment allows for expressing general statements similar to (2) and (3), while singular uses of proper names are treated as preceded by an unarticulated demonstrative expression (as in "[That] John was nice to me"). On the other hand, many regard this picture as lacking a core appealing property of causal chain theories, which is the directly referential character of proper names, since metalinguistic predicates are not rigid designators. Statements like:

(4) It is possible that John could have not been named 'John'

seem similarly intuitively true as (2) and (3); however, under the predicativist view, it is hard to provide an analysis that would yield a similar result,[2] since the

[1] Kaplan (1990) disagrees: using his distinction between common-currency and generic names (108-10) he tries to maintain that although all the three people called 'John' in this example have different *common-currency names,* which name particular individuals in a manner similar to logical constants, they have the same *generic name*, which are "the genera, or species, of our individual common currency names" (108). However, using such distinction to interpret (1) is problematic. According to Kaplan, a generic name "doesn't name any*one*, perhaps it names or is an unnatural kind" (111); therefore one cannot be called or named with a generic name. I thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

[2] This is true at least of two popular proposals concerning the semantics of statements of the form "That F is G", which take the predicate F to have direct input into the statement's truth conditions (e.g., Neale 1993; Richard 1993). Theories that reject this premise (e.g., Larson & Segal 1995), on the other hand, are difficult to be regarded as consistent with the predicativist account. As pointed out by the anonymous referee, "[That] John" could also receive a quantifier interpretation [The x: x is called 'John'], which, assuming the wide scope of the description, would yield the desired verdict. Such proposals may be however subject to further similar counterexamples. Consider the pair of statements: "John is a father. This could have been true". The interpretation yielded by such a proposal would be that this pair of statements is true if in some worlds the demonstrated individual (even if he's called 'Tony' and is childless) is called 'John' and is a father—which seems counterintuitive assuming the predicativist account. Of course, the point of this argument is more modest than saying that predicativist theories cannot provide a satisfying account of modal rigidity of names; I rather wish to argue that it certainly is an obstacle for these theories, and a theory which avoids it should be preferred if available. Some predicativists argue for that reason that proper names are, in fact, non-rigid and try to explain away this intuition (see Bach 2002: 85-88).

first occurrence of ‘John’ in (4) refers to only those individuals who are named ‘John’ in a given possible world.

The indexicalist theory of proper names—a semantic theory that identifies them as a class of indexicals—seemingly allows for an intuitive accommodation of these two properties of names: the possibility of ambiguity and their modal rigidity. Pure indexicals such as ‘I’ or ‘now’ or demonstratives such as ‘that’ clearly exhibit desired properties: neither has a fixed referent if taken as types, but their utterances in context are directly referential and rigid. It is also noted in the literature, that indexicals may have uses similar to the ones exhibited in (2) or (3), such as: “Everyone of them were nice to me” or “There are several *shes* in the room right now” (see Kijania-Placek 2016; I write more about such uses in Section 4.2). Indexicalist accounts defended by Recanati (1993), Pelczar & Rainsbury (1998), which may be regarded as the most influential, liken proper names to ‘pure indexicals’, expressions that refer to objective features of the context of the utterance (picked by what Kaplan [1989a] calls a ‘character’ of an expression) rather than the intention or gesture provided by the speaker. Others call for an analysis in terms of complex demonstrative expressions, such as “that *N*” (Rami 2014). In my paper, I want to take a different route and show how proper names may be characterised as simple demonstratives. I will first discuss the problems of the mentioned indexical theories and show how a demonstrative account may address them. Secondly, I will sketch a demonstrative approach based on the notion of a “hybrid proper name” developed, among others, by Künne (1992, 2010), Textor (2015), and Penco (2013). Thirdly and lastly, I will show the benefits of such treatment and counter two possible objections to this view.

2. Problems of Existing Indexical Theories

Although an indexical picture of proper name reference may be found in many texts of early analytic philosophy of language (notably Russell 1950 and Dąmbska 1949), the first two major proposals arguing for it are the ones of Recanati (1993) and Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998). While Recanati states his theory in terms of different modes of presentation, Pelczar and Rainsbury prefer to speak in terms of ‘character’ and ‘content’ borrowed from Kaplan (1989a), but their approach may be treated as similar.[3] In this section, I will use Pelczar and Rainsbury’s account as representative.

Pelczar and Rainsbury, directly inspired by Kaplan’s treatment of indexical expressions, take proper names to be indexicals which reference is established by the contextual presence (or “being in force”) of the dubbing, that is the act of naming a particular individual. In standard formalizations of statements containing indexical expressions the context set—paired with the sentence-type to yield appropriate interpretation—consists of the agent, time, location and the possible world of utterance, with different pure indexicals being sensitive to different of these parameters. The utterance of ‘I’ is sensitive to the change in agent-parameter, while ‘here’, ‘now’ and ‘actual’ to the changes in time, location and possible world parameters (Pelczar & Rainsbury 1998: 294-95). According to Pelczar and Rainsbury, similar treatment and sensitivity may be offered for utterances of proper names, if we assume that dubbings are also parameters of the context:

[3] For a direct comparison of Recanati’s and Pelczar and Rainsbury’s theories, see Matushansky 2008: 595, 597, 599; Ridley 2016: 108.

> Echoing Kaplan's insight with respect to the indexical, 'I', we say that what a competent English speaker knows, as such, about the word 'John' is not its content with regard to some particular occasion of its use. Rather, a competent English speaker with the word 'John' in his vocabulary knows the rule which assigns to each context of utterance of 'John' a function which assigns to each possible world whatever was dubbed 'John' in the dubbing in force governing 'John' in that context of utterance. Competent speakers know that the proper use of 'John' is—loosely speaking—to refer to something called 'John'. What someone knows by virtue of knowing this rule is the character of 'John', not its content (or, extension) with respect to a given utterance of it. The meaning of a proper name, then, is to be identified with its character (Pelczar & Rainsbury 1998: 297).

Given such characteristics, we may interpret their remarks[4] as suggesting that proper names are pure indexicals like 'I', 'here' or 'now', which are assigned additional contextual parameters, dubbings, when uttered:

(Indexicalism 1) A character of a proper name 'N' assigns different utterances of 'N' in the context c a certain dubbing being in force[5] in c.

According to Pelczar and Rainsbury, we might interpret utterance of (1) as being supplied with a contextually salient (brought to the attention of the speakers and thus being in force) *set of dubbings*—d_1, d_2, d_3—which are assigned to different uses of 'John' in (1). We may therefore speak of the same name (contrary to the causal-chain view) being uttered three times in (1), while still those distinct uses rigidly refer to different bearers, which are assigned to different uses of 'John' in (1).

A commonly raised objection to (Indexicalism 1) is that it relies heavily on the notion of contextually salient dubbing (or naming convention). Although it seems intuitive, the way of bringing certain dubbing into force (and making it a constituent of the context set) is not provided by the authors. A common way to describe it would be to employ a Gricean maxim of quality[6]—for example, the circumstances of the utterance of (1) may make it clear who are the intended referents of uses of the name 'John' given that the speaker wants to convey meaning

[4] This claim comes from the parallel that Pelczar and Rainsbury draw between proper names and pure indexicals rather than demonstratives (although the distinction is, of course, vague and hotly debated). In fact one may interpret this theory in an intentionalist way, where the appropriate dubbing comes into force through the intention of the speaker (and therefore reference of a proper name utterance is intention-dependent). Pelczar (2001) in fact suggests such a reading when he writes that choosing the appropriate dubbing is a matter of "speaker's discretion" (149-50), however he also states that "[a]ny effort to state precisely the conditions under which a given dubbing of a thing with a particular name is in force (in any context) quickly leads to the consideration of multifarious factors, semantic, pragmatic, and even extra-linguistic, that, to say the least, resist tidy encapsulation" (143). If Pelczar and Rainsbury's theory is interpreted as an intentionalist-demonstrative treatment of proper names, their theory is still subject to similar objections as Rami's theory criticized further in the article. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

[5] In line with Recanati's interpretation, one should speak here of "naming conventions" instead of "dubbings-in-force".

[6] Pelczar and Rainsbury suggest, although do not explicitly commit to, such reading of their theory: "one of the competing dubbings must be brought to prominence in order to determine a unique referent for the name (in that use). This might be achieved by a variety of mechanisms. One important factor in this raising to prominence might be relevant features of the conversation (if any) of the context of utterance of the name" (1998: 295).

in accordance with conversational rules. However, this approach would make the semantic value of a proper name dependent on pragmatic conventions. If we grant that the speaker of (1) might refer to Johns in the room in a different order or to some other people named 'John' in this situation and do so without bringing their dubbings into the conversation, the Gricean way is not a way out of this problem.

One might also notice that there is a problem in sentences like (1) with pairing different uses of 'John' with the contextually salient dubbings, given that in Kaplan-style semantics we use a whole sentence as a point of reference and assign the appropriate values of the context to utterances within it. If we look at the statement:

(5) John is here now

according to Pelczar and Rainsbury, we should represent it as a pair of the sentence type and the context set:

(5') < ["John is here now"], <a, t, l, @, d_1>>

and in the standard manner pick t as a referent of 'now', l as a referent of 'here', and d_1 as a dubbing picking out the referent of 'John'. However, if we will represent (1) in the same manner:

(1') < ["If John would quiet down, John could hear what John is saying"], <a, t, l, @, d_1, d_2, d_3>>

then we have no semantic rule that picks, for example, d_1 instead of d_3 as an appropriate dubbing for the first occurrence of 'John' in (1). Even if there was a clear way of bringing dubbings into force, then matching of utterances with them still seems to employ some pragmatic clues. It seems doubtful, therefore, that we may characterise proper names as pure indexicals with a strict character insensitive of the speaker's intentions.

Dolf Rami's (2014) theory was aimed at improving these flaws of Pelczar and Rainsbury's theory, which it does by tying referents identified in context with a particular occurrence of a proper name within an utterance and listing three principles of identification of the referent, which replace the dubbing-in-force or a naming convention. Rami presents his idea of establishing the reference of a contextually sensitive proper name in the following manner:

(Indexicalism 2) "$[[N_x]]_{c, <w, t>}$ is the object that is identified *demonstratively, descriptively or parasitically* in c_w in respect to the occurrence *x* of 'N' by c_a and that is a bearer of 'N' at c_t" (Rami 2014: 139).

According to Rami, demonstrative, descriptive, or parasitic identifications are ways of determining the referent by the speaker in a given context. In his characterisation, it seems clear that proper names are no more conceived as pure indexicals as in Recanati's or Pelczar and Rainsbury's works, but as a class of complex demonstratives. Three types of identification listed are mechanisms available to the speaker to single out his desired reference: demonstrative identification concerns cases of the direct presence of the named object, while descriptive and parasitic are indirect forms of unique identification. The speaker may do so by using a definite description or an intention "to use the name 'N' in the same way as [...] a certain person or a certain group of people" (Rami 2014: 127).

The second condition visible in (Indexicalism 2) is a condition according to which the intended referent must be a bearer of the name at the time of utterance. This comes from the classic analysis of complex demonstratives of the form "that F", which takes the predicate 'F' to be present in the truth conditions of the sentence or reference conditions for the complex demonstrative (such analysis was provided, for example, by Richard 1993; Borg 2000). However, these theories are unable to explain a class of examples of successful reference without the referent being the bearer of a specific name as witnessed in the following exchange:

(6) A: John has been acting weird lately.
B: That's true, especially since he changed his name to 'Clark'.

As one may see, under Rami's characteristics, A's (and hence B's) statement cannot be true—Clark is not called 'John' anymore at c_t, and therefore A has failed to refer to him. B, however, recognised A's intention and asserted his words, although he considered Clark not to be the bearer of 'John' anymore.[7, 8]

3. Proper Names as Hybrid Demonstratives

Responding to the problems of these theories, I believe that a promising analysis of proper names may be given by treating them as a class of simple demonstratives analogous to 'this' or 'that'. As mentioned in the discussion of conversation (6), it allows us to avoid problems connected with the analysis of the semantics of complex demonstratives mentioned as well as to keep the directly referential character of names.

In my characteristics, I want to use the "hybrid approach" towards indexicals. This notion has been coined by Wolfgang Künne (1992) in his interpretation of a passage from Frege and further remarks by Wittgenstein and Schlick. Unlike the classic Kaplan-style approach, the hybrid approach treats utterances of indexicals as hybrid entities composed of the utterance and its referent (Künne 1992; Predelli 2006) or a pointing gesture (Kripke 2008; Künne 2010; Penco 2013; Textor 2015). The idea is roughly that in the case of utterances of indexicals we should extend our notion of being a linguistic entity to include also extra-linguistic factors such as features of context. Instead of analysing in a Kaplanian fashion sentences containing indexicals by pairing sentence types with respective contexts of utterances, we analyse particular utterances with contextual parameters being present as parts of the utterances of indexicals. The indexicality is, in this view, captured by the phenomenon of introducing extra-linguistic objects or acts as parts of utterances instead of the change of content in differing contexts. Treating proper names as indexicals would mean in the hybrid approach representing their different utterances as pairs of their tokens and referents ("utterance-referent" view) or demonstrations ("utterance-demonstration" view). On such view, the same name-type "John" might be used to refer to $John_1$ and $John_2$, and this fact is captured by

[7] A similar point is raised by Ridley (2016), who considers an example of people calling St. Petersburg by its Soviet name 'Leningrad'. Both Pelczar and Rainsbury and Rami agree that proper uses of names that accord with an outdated convention are impossible, either because of the "synchronic invariability" (Pelczar & Rainsbury 1998: 297) of proper names or the perceived oddity of statements such as "Leningrad has over 2 million inhabitants in 2022" (Rami 2014: 143). If one wants to revise Rami's view (as suggested by an anonymous reviewer) to account for using such outdated conventions, one might further consider examples of similar conversations which would involve cases of identity theft, where the appropriate naming convention was never created.

[8] One may also see that the similar line of argument may be pointed against classic predicativist theories of proper name reference, if one (as, e.g., Tyler Burge [1973]) regards statements such as the one made by A to contain an unarticulated article 'the' or 'that' ("[That] John has been acting weird lately") and maintains that the proper name is taken as a predicate.

representing the two referring utterances of “John” as pairs of its token and either $John_1$ or $John_2$ themselves, or uniquely referring demonstrations of them.

I will opt for the “utterance-referent” view of hybrid proper names in my analysis for two reasons. Firstly, most uses of proper names lack any associated pointing gesture; this would be the case only in situations where (to borrow Rami’s phrase) demonstrative identification is possible. The concept of a “demonstration” would have to be highly stretched and artificial to fit the situation in which, for example, I want to refer to an Egyptian pharaoh by uttering the name ‘Ramses’. Secondly, as noted by Predelli (2006), this view does not seem to secure the rigidity of proper names, since the same entity composed of an utterance and a pointing gesture may have a different referent in some other possible world due to some other object being pointed.

If we rule out this option, then it is natural to opt for an intention-based view of demonstrative reference. This view is based on the concept of the referential intention of the speaker (an intention to refer to a particular object *n*). Under intentionalism, we may accommodate Rami’s remarks about the semantic importance of ways of identifying an object by the speaker in establishing reference. Such accounts originate in Kaplan’s (1989b) remarks about the demonstrative reference in “Afterthoughts” and were defended, for example, by Bach (1992) and Åkerman (2009). For simplicity’s sake, we may simply assume that the object that is a component of the hybrid proper name is picked out by the referential intention of the speaker, which may be driven by the demonstrative, descriptive, or parasitic act of identification in Rami’s sense.

In my view, therefore, the utterance of a proper name N performed by the speaker with an intention to refer to *n* should be formalised as:

<)*N*(<l, t>, n>,

where “)*N*(<l, t>” should be read as “the token of an expression ‘N’ uttered at place *l*, at time *t*” (which is a use of “token quotation” invented by Reichenbach [1947] as developed by Ciecierski [2020]). The idea behind such formalism is that whenever a speaker refers to a particular object by using a proper name, one uses a specific proper name-type ‘N’ to reveal her referential intention (“to refer to n”) to the hearer in a given communication context.

As noted by Stefano Predelli (2006), a hybrid approach to indexicals also allows for better treatment of elliptic reference. Consider the following exchange:

(7) A: I am a great fan of Truman Capote.
B: I am not [a great fan of Truman Capote].

Suppose that B actually does not know anything about Truman Capote or that he mistakenly believes that the name in question actually refers to Charles Dickens. Under Kaplan-inspired semantics, both of these statements need to be assessed under their respective context of utterance:

(7') A: <[“I am a great fan of Truman Capote”], <a_1, t_1, l_1, @, d_1 >>.
B: <[“I am not [a great fan of Truman Capote]”] <a_2, t_2, l_2, @, d_2 >>.

And as we may see, the referent of the tokens of “Truman Capote” may differ if, for example, this conversation is carried out by two different agents in different settings and with different dubbings or conventions in force. The hybrid approach allows to analyse this conversation in a uniform way, which secures the reference of the proper name across contexts:

(7") A: $[<)\mathrm{I}(<\mathrm{l}_1, \mathrm{t}_1>, a_1>]$ [am a great fan of] $[<)\text{Truman Capote}(<\mathrm{l}_3, \mathrm{t}_3>, n]$.
B: $[<)\mathrm{I}(<\mathrm{l}_2, \mathrm{t}_2>, a_2>]$ [am not] [[a great fan of] $[<)\text{Truman Capote}(<\mathrm{l}_3, \mathrm{t}_3>, n>]]$.

As we may see in the same manner, we may escape the trouble of pairing tokens and dubbings seen in Pelczar and Rainsbury's analysis of (1). In the hybrid approach, (1) ought to be represented as:

(1") [If] $[<)\text{John}(<\mathrm{l}_1, \mathrm{t}_1>, j_1>]$ [would quiet down], $[<)\text{John}(<\mathrm{l}_2, \mathrm{t}_2>, j_2>]$ [could hear what] $[<)\text{John}(<\mathrm{l}_3, \mathrm{t}_3>, j_3>]$ [is saying],

where the respective referents of tokens of the name 'John'—j_1, j_2, j_3—are picked by the referential intentions of the speaker of (1) formed with the demonstrative act of identification. The appropriate matching of name tokens and their referents is another reason to support the hybrid treatment of demonstratives instead of the traditional Kaplanian account. The formal problem of pairing demonstratives within a sentence with respective intentions/gestures present in the context was raised, for example, by Braun (1996).

Contrary to Rami's theory, under the provided analysis, the referential success in uttering (1) does not require the referent to be the bearer of the name 'John' in the present context. This, of course, may raise some issues (which I will address in the last part of my paper), but let us now focus on the two benefits it brings. Firstly, this allows us to counter the objection sketched at the end of the previous section: the cases of referential success when the referred object is not (currently) the bearer of the name used. What is profound about this is that this objection applies not only to Rami's theory, but also to many contemporary theories of proper name reference, such as causal-chain or predicativist approaches. If we are inclined to say that A successfully referred to Clark in (6), then we should count this as a massive benefit of the simple-demonstrative treatment.

Secondly, the hybrid-demonstrative view escapes the objection raised, for example, by García-Carpintero (2018: 1150), who argues that by using the notion of "being the bearer of 'N'", Rami presupposes the functioning of proper names in their non-indexical form.[9] In the view defended here, there is no theoretical motivation for introducing them. Naming conventions may be seen as chains of uses of demonstratives uttered with a parasitic intention essentially dependent on the reference of some demonstrative (e.g., a speech act of Kripkean baptism) or descriptive use, as I will explain further. Therefore, the hybrid-demonstrative view escapes the threat of theoretical redundancy that may haunt other indexical theories.

4. Possible Objections to the Demonstrative Theory

Both the hypothesis that proper names are simple demonstratives and the use of a hybrid approach may raise some objections that prevented many philosophers of language from looking at proper names this way before. In the last sections of my paper, I would like to deal with the ones I take to be the most widespread: the "Humpty-Dumpty" objection against strong intentionalist accounts of demonstrative reference and Manuel García-Carpintero's objection against indexical theories from the linguistic competence of ordinary language users.

[9] García-Carpintero's universal argument against all indexical theories is discussed in the subsequent section (4.2).

4.1 Humpty-Dumpty Objection

Historically, the Humpty-Dumpty objection dates back to Alfred MacKay's (1968) critique of Donnellan's distinction between referential and attributive uses of description and has since been adapted against intentionalism regarding the reference of simple demonstratives (e.g., by Corazza et al. [2002] and Gorvett [2005]). This objection is based on the statement that, considering the intention of reference as a sufficient condition for reference by a given expression (description, expression indicating whether, in our case, a proper name), we are forced to consider that the speaker can quite freely refer to any object by using any linguistic expression, even if it would break the linguistic convention. A similar position is most often summarised by the words of the hero of *Through the Looking-Glass* by Lewis Carroll, Humpty Dumpty: "If I use a word [...] it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less".

This requires some explanation. Surely, the intentions of the kind represented by the character of a Lewis Carroll novel seem somewhat unnatural. Can we, in the normal sense of the word, intend to refer to a certain object (say, John) by any proper name that is not related to it in any way (e.g., the name "World War II")? A classic analysis of the concept of intention would force us to ask if in such a case the subject can be convinced that he will be able to refer to John by employing the name "World War II". A supporter of the Humpty-Dumpty objection might rightly point out here that if the only condition for a valid reference is to have such an intention, then such a belief would not be surprising. However, one should distinguish here, after Bach (1992) and Åkerman (2009), two kinds of intentions present in communication. The intention to refer is one thing, and the intention to communicate certain content to your audience is something else. The agent could therefore be convinced that he would be able to refer to John by employing the name "World War II", but the conviction that by using this name he could convey the content of his referential intention to other participants in the act of communication would be completely irrational. If a subject considers that conveying this content by using this name is impossible due to the applicable conventions, then they cannot create a communicative intention of the given type, as the subject cannot have the intention of doing something that he considers impossible to do. Just as I cannot, correctly speaking, have the intention of flowing out of the window of the Institute of Philosophy on a broom (since I consider it physically impossible), nor can I have the intention of communicating my wish to refer to Saul Kripke by using the name "World War II" to my audience[10]. Since the speaker usually wants his referential intention to be correctly interpreted, he will employ means understood by others.

According to the proposed view, the relationship between employing a certain naming convention and referential success is not necessary, but rather it is pragmatically necessary for the speaker to use the appropriate convention to communicate their referential intention to the hearer. It is useful to think about the question of what constitutes the propriety of a certain naming convention. Such conventions

[10] Unless I introduce others to my bizarre way of speaking, e.g. by saying "Recognizing historical importance and impact of the author of "Naming and Necessity", I will refer to him during today's lecture as 'World War II'". Then it would not be odd to say that I actually referred to Saul Kripke with the name "World War II", since my intention was easily communicated to the audience.

can, but need not be introduced in any formal way, such as administrative decision or baptism. Consider the following example introduced by Paul Ziff:[11]

> A hungry long white whiskered kitten wanders into my garden. I say to one in the family 'Let's feed that thing'. We do so. The next day I ask 'Where's the cat?' and my son replies 'Whiskers is in the kitchen': no baptismal act no act of ostension and yet the cat has acquired the name 'Whiskers' (1977: 321).

The convention of calling the cat 'Whiskers' may spring into existence even without any particular dubbing. What matters is that, from now on, this name would be applied to the cat and the intention to refer to it would be understood by any other member of the community. What matters in constituting the convention of naming *n* with the proper name 'N' is therefore a constant practice of successfully conveying the intention to refer to *n* to the hearers with the use of 'N'.

However, there are certainly cases where the referential intention is properly formed and the speaker misuses the appropriate naming convention. A similar problem is known in the literature as "the mismatch cases". It is useful to distinguish between two possible variants of such cases. In one of these, the use of a name occurs when the subject is directly familiar with the object that he wishes to refer by a proper name: (a) is mistaken in saying the appropriate name, or (b) has misconceptions about the adopted naming convention. Case (a) is well captured by the following passage from David Kaplan:

> I have witnessed and been the subject of such experiences on many occasions concerning proper names. 'Wait a minute,' says the person, 'Did I just say "Eleanor?" I meant "Harriett"'. Some dark force reached the speaker's psyche and misdirected the hand of intention (Kaplan 1990: 105, note 11).

However, while Kaplan, as a supporter of the causal-historical theory, must accept that in a similar case we are dealing with a very peculiar way of saying the name 'Harriett', a supporter of a demonstrative analysis of proper names does not have to resort to it. In the above case, the intuition that the speaker nevertheless said something about Harriett is explained by his referential intention, while the misunderstanding by his failure to communicate this intention to the audience. We can assume that Kaplan's utterance of the proper name had the form <)*Eleanor*(<l, t>, *h*> (since he referred to Harriett by using the token of the name "Eleanor"), although his intended form was, of course, <)*Harriett*(<l, t>, *h*>.

Cases of type (b) are more subtle. Imagine a group of unrepentant supporters of the Communist Party who did not accept that in 1991 their hometown's name was changed from 'Leningrad' to 'St. Petersburg'. Such people, when communicating with others, keep using a name that has ceased to function in the official or colloquial nomenclature. Should we say that when using the name 'Leningrad' they do not refer to St. Petersburg or merely that they have misconceptions about the functioning of certain names in the language? In my opinion, intuitively, one should admit the second option is right, in line with the intuition represented in the discussion of (6). Regardless of the naming convention, these people talk

[11] Note that such an example is also problematic for the account of Pelczar and Rainsbury, for if we agree that in saying "Whiskers is in the kitchen" Ziff's son actually referred to the cat, he did so without any particular act of dubbing the cat 'Whiskers' even existing.

about a certain city, although perhaps in an outdated and ideological way. This is a pragmatic error at best, not a semantic one.

The same is true when considering cases similar to the famous "Madagascar argument" by Gareth Evans (Evans 1973). Evans points to cases in which the practice of referring to a certain object (Madagascar Island) differs significantly from the reference intended in the original act of naming (according to historical sources, the fragment of the African land on the territory of present-day Somalia was originally "christened" with the name 'Madagascar'), which is supposed to indicate the erroneous predictions of Kripke's causal-historical theory.

To explain this phenomenon, Evans appeals to the notion of a community-based naming practice (1973: 202). But what constitutes the "practice" adopted by the community? From what point do the single uses of the name 'Madagascar' used to refer to an island constitute a practice that allows language users to use it in a "new sense"? The answer suggested by the demonstrative name analysis is: from the moment when some directly demonstrative uses have been mediated by other users who are not directly familiar with the object in question. We can imagine such first uses in line with this practice: sailors who come to Europe use the name 'Madagascar' to denote where they came from or sea traders pointing to an island off the coast of Africa on a map stating, "The next frigate will go to Madagascar to buy pepper and ivory". Such sailors were *referring to the island*, despite the fact that the widespread convention at the time took the name 'Madagascar' to refer to the mainland. If we disagree with this fact, we do not have any easy explanation of why certain naming convention or practice came to exist, and why suddenly the name shifted referents. It is certainly a piece of philosophical fiction to think that we may identify one original mistake in reference which should be designated as a *dubbing* of the island with the name 'Madagascar'.

The situation may be quite different if the subject does not have direct knowledge of the reference of the name. Such uses are widespread: we often use names whose reference we are briefly acquainted with, unable to specify a bundle of features distinguishing a given object. We can define similar reference cases as parasitic, in line with the terminology proposed by Rami. We are then inclined to use the name to refer to the same object that someone else referred to by using that name. To compare this to other demonstratives, you can refer to the class of intentions specified by Kent Bach (1992) in a discussion with Marga Reimer—intentions to refer to the object you point to. Then the subject does not have a specific, unambiguously identifying method of indicating the reference other than referring to a certain naming practice, borrowed from another person.

For example, I may be wrong in thinking that the world record holder in the sprint is Olusoji Fasuba, although, in fact, the record holder is Usain Bolt. Even so, when I say "Olusoji Fasuba is the fastest sprinter in the world", I say something false, because my referential intention in this case is to refer to the referent of the name ("<)*Olusoji Fasuba*(<1, t>, *f*") used by someone from whom I borrowed it. If I intend to state that Usain Bolt is the fastest sprinter and accidentally use the name "Olusoji Fasuba", then we are dealing with a similar case as Kaplan's slips-of-tongue, and this name should be represented, due to the intention accompanying the statement, as "<)*Olusoji Fasuba*(<1, t>, *u*>".

The given theory, at least at first glance, seems to respond well to cases of mismatch by distinguishing between referential and communicative intentions. It also does not appear to be susceptible to the devastating consequences of the

Humpty-Dumpty argument, and even if they were derivable, one could, by pointing to the cases of 'Madagascar' or 'Leningrad', answer with the slogan popular among computer scientists: *It's not a bug; it's a feature!*

4.2 Linguistic Competence Objection and Predicative Uses

Another interesting remark aimed more generally against indexical theories of proper name reference was recently made by Manuel García-Carpintero (2018). The argument, as presented, aims to show that indexical theories fail to account for our intuitive conditions of linguistic competence for using proper names, which presents no problem for other theories of proper name semantics, especially predicativism. Manuel García-Carpintero, in his article "The Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names" (2018), quotes the following passage from Schoubye:

> Another reason to think that there is a difference between the context-sensitivity of pronouns and lexical ambiguity is this: it would be entirely unsurprising and unremarkable if some speaker *S* was competent with only one meaning of a lexically ambiguous word. For example, *S* might know that 'bat' is used to talk about a piece of sporting equipment, but not know that it is also used to talk about nocturnal animals. In contrast, it would be surprising and quite remarkable if, say, the word 'she' was part of *S*'s vocabulary (i.e. suppose *S* used the word to refer to his mother), yet *S* was unaware that it can be used to refer to different individuals. Indeed, one might think that *S*, in this case, is just not competent with the meaning of 'she'. In contrast, in the previous case, it does seem that *S* is competent with one of the meanings of 'bat' (Schoubye 2017: 731-32).

Then García-Carpintero himself writes:

> Similarly, someone who assumed that names, like social security numbers, have only one bearer would not thereby be incompetent in their use. For commoners, these differences should just be answerable to contingent beliefs about how widespread is the extension of the predicative conditions with which the expressions are associated (García-Carpintero 2018: 1143).

García-Carpintero's argument therefore states that the indexical answer to the problem of multiple references does not reflect well the nature of the linguistic competence of using a proper name. A child who learns proper names and assigns each person a single, uniquely identifying name is not an incompetent user of it only because he has not yet met another person who would have the same name as, for example, his family members. If we admit, following Kaplan, that to grasp the meaning of a certain expression one must know its character, and such knowledge is a necessary condition for considering a person to be a competent user of the expression, then it turns out that our theory requires too much from average users of names.

I believe that García-Carpintero's argument is incorrect, but in order to capture the error, attention should be paid to a very important issue in the context of our considerations. To fully accept this argument, the concept of *linguistic competence* used by Schoubye and García-Carpintero should be clearly formulated. This, however, seems difficult. A "competent language user" is as real as, in the words of Daniel Dennett, "the Equator or an average Canadian"—it is merely an idealisation, useful only in some cases. The only way to make it useful is to define what *de facto* competence we are dealing with. Is being a competent user of 'N' in Schoubye's sense necessary for such a user to refer with 'N'? This seems at least not obvious. *S* from Schoubye's story seems to refer to his mother using the word 'she', although he is not a competent user of 'she' in the sense in which he is unable to refer to other persons with the use of this pronoun. As mentioned by García-Carpintero, the mistake of *S* seems to lie in a *metalinguistic* belief he holds—his belief that *the pronoun 'she'* can be applied solely to one person. One could of course disagree with García-Carpintero on this point while still maintaining his argument[12]—the competent use of a pronoun could be understood then as a disposition to refer to certain people with the word 'she', without invoking any beliefs about its extension. But then it seems that "someone who assumed that names, like social security numbers, have only one bearer" is also incompetent. If someone is unable to use the same name-type "John" to refer both to *John*$_1$ and *John*$_2$ in their presence and is disposed to call only one of them by that name, might be considered similarly incompetent as *S*. To run García-Carpintero's argument one necessarily needs to claim that *assuming* that indexicals do not refer to more than one person is odd, while assuming the same about proper names is not. Therefore one needs to invoke mistaken metalinguistic beliefs of the speaker and claim, that such understood competence (that is, accurately representing the character of an expression) is crucial for reference.

Paul Ziff in *Semantic Analysis* (1960) draws attention to an important element of the question regarding the nature of the competence to use a proper name. He writes: "If I say 'are you familiar with *Hsieh Ho's* views on art?' I am speaking English: I am not speaking a combination of English and Chinese" (Ziff 1960: 86); knowledge of proper names is not an element of the competence of any language, as they do not belong to any of them separately.[13] Proper names are not part of the dictionaries of the correct Chinese or English, nor are they (in the traditional sense) translatable from one language to another. Thus, they are primarily a reference tool. To show how this perception of proper names can be related to their interpretation as hybrid demonstratives, a simple thought experiment can be offered. Imagine a language in which demonstratives are completely replaced by gestures. For example, instead of saying "Bring it to me", I say in this language: "Bring me [the gesture pointing to the item]". Such a language is conceivable; the types of gestures we make, in the same sense as in the example of Ziff, do not belong to any language (although perhaps different cultures could have used, for example, different hand positions or complement the statement with an eyebrow movement) and are not, in the traditional sense, its expressions. Could we express with such language all that we are able to express with ours? Sure, some expressions might look strange, but it seems that for simple demonstrative uses, there would not be much of a difference between the two languages.

[12] I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this possibility to my attention.

[13] Some (e.g., McKinsey 1984) reject Ziff's argument by saying that, in the given example, by simply employing the name "Hsieh Ho" in an English sentence, we establish this name as an English name. But this way of looking at this issue is, in my opinion, dubious. We tend to think that a necessary condition for being a competent speaker of some language *L* is knowing the complete vocabulary of *L*, which is impossible if we are to count all (that is, an infinity of) proper names as its potential parts. Similarly, a person who does not know some specific proper name (say, "Bertrand Russell") does not seem to particularly lack knowledge of *English*.

We can imagine that the grammarians of such a language would list particular types or forms of demonstrative gestures, just as we list on the basis of sounds the words 'this', 'that', or 'he'. But can everything that can be expressed in our language be directly translated into that imaginary language? We can notice that some difficulties may be caused by conversations similar to these:

A: *He* is a bit aggressive, but *she* is such a cute little monkey.
B: I think you are confused. Both of my kittens are *shes*.[14]

In order to allow for a meaningful formulation of such sentences at all (without even considering whether B's statement is true), B would have to specify two different gestures (corresponding to 'he' and 'she') and assign them to types of some kind of content (indicative of gender) or at least a syntactic property (gender) that can pragmatically imply certain properties of the referred object. Additionally, B would have to be aware that with a certain type of gesture (equivalent to 'she'), he is able to refer to more than one object. This would require the existence of conventional rules linking the use of certain gestures to the information conveyed and that users have a notion of the type of gesture by which they can refer to a certain class of objects.

Is it so, however, that ignorance of these facts prevents competent reference by means of the pointing gesture? Probably not, because communication by means of these gestures is still possible even when users do not have this metalinguistic knowledge. We can therefore distinguish between two levels of linguistic competence that interest us. One of them will be *the competence to refer* with a name, the other *metalinguistic competence*, which is related to the knowledge of the semantic properties of the name as a linguistic object.

The first of them does not require too much from the average language user. According to the picture outlined earlier, referring with the use of a name requires only an appropriate referential intention, whether in a situation of direct demonstration or in a parasitic way, mediated by the practice of other users. The second one requires the user to have the concept of a proper name-type 'N' so that they can assign certain semantic properties to it, such as referring to individual objects or having a character.

Based on this distinction, we can make an observation on how the link between these two competences is treated by different theories of proper names. Predicativism (in line with García-Carpintero's argument) will maintain that both competences are identical; referring to a single object requires selecting a specific (context-relevant) object that is the salient reference of the description "bearer of the name 'N'". Causal-historical theories and classic descriptivist theories must hold that the two competences are completely distinct; if names behave similarly to individual constants or definite descriptions, then there is *de facto* nothing that would link two names with different references other than shape similarity. Meanwhile, the indexical theory (as presented here) postulates that one of the competences may ground the other. If we can refer to a specific object with a proper name, we learn at the same time that with a proper name we are able to refer to

[14] Example from Schoubye (2017: 29). An interesting analysis of descriptive and plural uses of both indexical expressions and proper names (e.g., in the proverbs: "Never do *tomorrow* what you can do *today*" or "What *Johnny* will not learn, *John* will not be able to do") can be found in Kijania-Placek (2016). I believe that the method of dealing with the cases proposed in this article may also be applied if proper names are taken to be demonstratives; therefore, readers interested in explaining this phenomenon are referred to the above text.

certain objects with communicational success. The metalinguistic competence is acquired by observing that the proper name 'N' can be effectively used by us to refer to many different objects, just as observing that with the use of 'she' *S* may refer to other people than his mother. Therefore, on the basis of the demonstrative theory, we can indicate a probable mechanism linking these two competences: if I am able as a user to refer to a specific object with the proper name 'N', then I can probably also describe this process in an abstract way ("referring with 'N' to an object *o*") and thus formulate general statements similar to Burge's examples.

Note that although the demonstrative theory liberally treats the question of reference (it is possible to refer with the name 'N' to any object that is the subject of the speaker's adequate reference intention), in the case of predicative uses, we deal with the use of the potential of the proper name-type that is delimited by existing conventions derived from uniquely referential uses.

For example, the sentence:

(3) There are several Johns in the room right now.

could be read as:

(3') There are several people in the room right now who, by some convention, can be referred to with the name 'John'.

A similar analysis has a certain advantage over the classic predicative positions when considering family or hereditary names. The statement:

(8) Every Kennedy has sat in Congress for the Democratic Party

would be true, according to the classic predicative reading, if every congressional holder of the surname 'Kennedy' was a Democratic candidate. A similar statement is false, but Louisiana-elected Republican Senator John Kennedy, unrelated to the famous political clan, would certainly not be considered as a counterexample by the speaker of (4), who intended to refer only to the members of the "Kennedy clan". On the basis of our analysis, however, there is nothing to prevent the intended interpretation from being limited from any convention to a specific naming convention *C*, which includes only members of a certain family among potential referents. Then (4) would be read as:

(8') Every person who can be referred to with the name 'Kennedy' under convention *C* has sat in Congress for the Democratic Party

in line with our expectations. Thus, it can be seen that a thorough analysis of the linguistic competences of users allows us to clearly define the competence that constitutes the basis for reference and predicative uses and also allows us to effectively analyse the cases problematic for classic predicativist theories.

5. Conclusion

This article's focus was to present and defend against possible objections to the treatment of proper names as hybrid-demonstrative expressions—expressions that contain extra-linguistic objects as their parts. I modify the standard treatment of hybrid expressions, presented by Künne (1992), Predelli (2006), and others, to adjust it to desirable features of proper name semantics and argue for regarding specific uses of proper names as ordered pairs of the name token and its referent picked by the speaker's referential intention. I argued that alternative indexical theories of proper name reference as put forward by Recanati (1993), Pelczar and

Rainsbury (1998), and Rami (2014) have either technical or pragmatic problems that make them less preferable to the presented view.

My view presupposes two theses: (1) intentionalism regarding the reference of simple demonstratives and (2) indexicalism about proper names. Since both are regarded as controversial among many philosophers of language, I decided to defend my view against two widely held objections to these two theses: the Humpty-Dumpty objection against intentionalism and García-Carpintero's argument against indexicalism from misdescription of linguistic competence. By rebutting these objections, I also demonstrate how the hybrid-demonstrative theory of proper names may account for 'Madagascar'-style (Evans 1973) cases of reference shift and predicative uses of names (Burge 1973).

Indexicalist approaches to proper name semantics had often been disregarded by philosophers as an implausible *ad hoc* solution to the problem of proper name ambiguity. As David Kaplan writes: "[t]hose who suggest that proper names are merely one species of indexical depreciate the power and the mystery of the causal chain theory" (1989a: 563). In a broader philosophical perspective, the aim of this paper may be regarded as a way of finding out whether disregarding this Kaplanian injunction may lead to interesting philosophical consequences. I hope that this paper provides sufficient evidence for a positive say to this hypothesis.

References

Åkerman, J. 2009, "A Plea for Pragmatics", *Synthese*, 170, 155-67.

Borg, E. 2000, "Complex Demonstratives", *Philosophical Studies*, 97, 229-49.

Bach, K. 1992, "Intentions and Demonstrations", *Analysis*, 52, 140-46.

Bach, K. 2002, "Giorgione was So-Called Because of His Name", *Philosophical Perspectives*, 16, 73-103.

Barcan Marcus, R. 1986, "Possibilia and Possible Worlds", *Grazer Philosophische Studien,* 25, 107-33.

Braun, D. 1996, "Demonstratives and Their Linguistic Meanings", *Noûs*, 30, 145-73.

Burge, T. 1973, "Reference and Proper Names", *The Journal of Philosophy*, 70, 425-39.

Ciecierski, T. 2020, "Utterances, Sub-utterances and Token-Reflexivity", *Theoria*, 86, 439-62.

Corazza, E., Fish, W., & Gorvett, J. 2002, "Who is I?", *Philosophical Studies*, 107, 1-21.

Dąmbska, I. 1949, "Z Filozofii Imion Własnych", in Pelc, J. (ed.), *Semiotyka Polska 1894-1969*, Warszawa: PWN, 1971.

Evans, G. 1973, "The Causal Theory of Names", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume*, 47, 187-208.

García-Carpintero, M. 2018, "The Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names", *Mind*, 127, 1107-68.

Gorvett, J. 2005, "Back Through the Looking Glass: On the Relationship between Intentions and Indexicals", *Philosophical Studies*, 124, 295-312.

Kaplan, D. 1989a, "Demonstratives", in Almog, J., Perry, J. & Wettstein, H. (eds.), *Themes from Kaplan*, New York: Oxford University Press, 481-563.

Kaplan, D. 1989b, "Afterthoughts", in Almog J., Perry, J. and Wettstein, H. (eds.), *Themes from Kaplan*, New York: Oxford University Press, 565-614.

Kaplan, D. 1990, "Words", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volumes*, 64, 93-119.

Kijania-Placek, K. 2016, "Indexicals and Names in Proverbs", *Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric*, 46, 59-78.

Korta, K. & Perry, J. 2011, *Critical Pragmatics: An Inquiry into Reference and Communication*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kripke, S.A. 1972, "Naming and Necessity", in Davidson, D. and Harman, G. (eds.), *Semantics of Natural Language*, Dordrecht: Springer, 253-355.

Kripke, S.A. 2008, "Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes", *Theoria*, 74, 181-218.

Künne, W. 1992, "Hybrid Proper Names", *Mind*, 101, 721-31.

Künne, W. 2010, "Sense, Reference and Hybridity: Reflections on Kripke's Recent Reading of Frege", *Dialectica*, 64, 529-51.

Larson, R.K., Segal, G.M.A. 1995, *Knowledge of Meaning: An Introduction to Semantic Theory*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

MacKay, A.F. 1968, "Mr. Donnellan and Humpty Dumpty on Referring", *The Philosophical Review*, 77, 197-202.

Matushansky, O. 2008, "On the Linguistic Complexity of Proper Names", *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 31, 573-627.

McKinsey, M. 1984, "Causality and the Paradox of Names", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 9, 491-515.

Neale, S. 1993, "Term Limits", *Philosophical Perspectives*, 7, 89-123.

Pelczar, M.W., Rainsbury, J.M. 1998, "The Indexical Character of Names", *Synthese*, 114, 293-317.

Pelczar, M.W. 2001, "Names as Tokens and Names as Tools", *Synthese*, 128, 133-55.

Penco, C. 2013, "Indexicals as Demonstratives: On the Debate between Kripke and Künne", *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 88, 55-71.

Predelli S., 2006, "Hybrid Indexicals and Ellipsis", *Erkenntnis*, 65, 385-403.

Rami, D. 2014, "The Use-Conditional Indexical Conception of Proper Names", *Philosophical Studies*, 168, 119-50.

Recanati, F. 1993, *Direct Reference: From Language to Thought*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Reichenbach, H. 1947, *Elements of Symbolic Logic*, New York: The Macmillan Company.

Richard, M. 1993, "Articulated Terms", *Philosophical Perspectives*, 7, 207-30.

Ridley, P. 2016, *A Pragmatic View of Proper Name Reference*, PhD thesis, King's College London, https://philpapers.org/archive/RIDAPV.pdf (accessed 1.05.2021).

Russell, B. 1950/2005, *Inquiries into Meaning and Truth*, London: George Allen & Unwin.

Schoubye, A.J. 2017, "Type-Ambiguous Names", *Mind*, 126, 715-67.

Textor, M. 2015, "Frege's Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Extended", *Mind*, 124, 823-47.

Ziff, P. 1960, *Semantic Analysis*, New York: Ithaca.

Ziff, P. 1977, "About Proper Names", *Mind*, 86, 319-32.