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		<title>It Is Impossible to Be Able to Do the Impossible</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/it-is-impossible-to-be-able-to-do-the-impossible-2/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Jan 2026 17:19:21 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2713</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Jack Spencer (2017) has recently argued that somebody might be able to do the impossible. His arguments consist, to a large extent, in describing a class of cases —G-cases, as he calls them—in which it is intuitively plausible to hold that somebody is able to do something impossible. Here is one of Spencer’s G-cases: Simple [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/it-is-impossible-to-be-able-to-do-the-impossible-2/">It Is Impossible to Be Able to Do the Impossible</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>The Unity of Motive [Lex Academic Prize]</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/the-unity-of-motive/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 14 Jul 2024 13:23:08 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>The role of intention in criminal law stands in stark contrast to that of motive. While intention’s significance for criminal liability is hardly ever contested, motive’s relevance is most frequently relegated to the peripheries. Norrie, for instance, considers the irrelevance of motive “as firmly established in legal doctrine as any rule could be” (Norrie 2014: [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/the-unity-of-motive/">The Unity of Motive [Lex Academic Prize]</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>It Is Impossible to Be Able to Do the Impossible</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/it-is-impossible-to-be-able-to-do-the-impossible/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Nov 2023 16:06:21 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Jack Spencer (2017) has recently argued that somebody might be able to do the impossible. His arguments consist, to a large extent, in describing a class of cases—G-cases, as he calls them—in which it is intuitively plausible to hold that somebody is able to do something impossible. Here is one of Spencer’s G-cases: &#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/it-is-impossible-to-be-able-to-do-the-impossible/">It Is Impossible to Be Able to Do the Impossible</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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