It Is Impossible to Be Able to Do the Impossible

Hausmann, Marco

Jack Spencer has recently argued that somebody might be able to do the impossible. In response, Anthony Nguyen has argued against Spencer’s arguments. In this paper, I do not argue against Spencer’s arguments. Instead, I argue directly against Spencer’s thesis. In the first part of my paper, I develop an argument that suggests that it is implausible that somebody is able to do the impossible (because somebody who is able to do the impossible would be able to do something that would have incredible consequences). In the second part of my paper, I develop an argument that suggests that it is impossible that somebody is able to do the impossible (because somebody who is able to do the impossible would have inconsistent obligations). In the third part of my paper, I discuss and reject three objections to my arguments. I conclude that there are good reasons to believe that it is impossible that somebody is able to do the impossible.

Jack Spencer (2017) has recently argued that somebody might be able to do the impossible. His arguments consist, to a large extent, in describing a class of cases —G-cases, as he calls them—in which it is intuitively plausible to hold that somebody is able to do something impossible. Here is one of Spencer’s G-cases:

Simple G: Suppose that determinism is true. Let h be the complete specification of the initial conditions of the universe. Let l be the complete specification of the deterministic laws of nature. Let h ∧ l be their conjunction. Suppose that G has not, does not, and will not believe that h ∧ l. G never finds herself reading a book or listening to a radio programme about the initial conditions or the laws of nature; G was home from school and sick with the flu on the day that her physics teacher covered the initial conditions and the laws of nature in class, and the physics teacher never bothered to go over the material again. We may suppose that it is fairly common knowledge in G’s community that h ∧ l, that matriculating high school seniors are expected to know that h ∧ l, that many of G’s classmates know that h ∧ l, and that G is one of the brightest students in her class. The proposition that h ∧ l does not exceed G’s cognitive wherewithal, either in length or in complexity, and there are no special obstacles preventing G from forming the belief (Spencer 2017: 468).

It is impossible that G knows that h ∧ l. For it is, on the one hand, impossible that G knows that h ∧ l and that it is not true that h ∧ l (given that it is impossible to know something false) and it is, on the other hand,…

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