Philosophy of law - Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy https://www.argumenta.org Journal of Analytic Philosophy Sun, 02 Apr 2023 22:58:35 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=7.1.3 Book Reviews https://www.argumenta.org/article/book-reviews-9/ Tue, 14 Sep 2021 08:46:23 +0000 https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&p=1406 The volume is composed of three parts. The first, “Basic Concepts for Legal Reasoning”, addresses a number of topics that are preliminary to an understanding and discussion of reasoning and argumentation in legal contexts. The titles of the chapters collected in this part read like this: Reasons (and Reasons in Philosophy of Law); Reasons in […]

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]]>  Meta-Meta-institutional Concepts? [Special Issue] https://www.argumenta.org/article/meta-meta-institutional-concepts-special-issue/ Sat, 24 Nov 2018 13:58:26 +0000 https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&p=937 The paper is a critical analysis of Hubert Schwyzer’s idea of meta-institutional concepts. The chief example of a meta-institutional concept is that of winning in a game. Games are different and have different rules. Nonetheless, they share the concept of victory that is present in most rulebooks. As Roversi (2014) says, we use the same […]

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]]> The Occasions of Law (and the Occasions of Interpretation) [Special Issue] https://www.argumenta.org/article/occasions-law-occasions-interpretation-special-issue/ Sat, 24 Nov 2018 03:17:54 +0000 https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&p=926 “No remark without remarkableness” is one of the philosopher John Searle’s most profound insights. It may be true, for example, that Professor X is not drunk, but if I say that Professor X is not drunk then something else is going on, and my statement has a more complex meaning. More specifically, by saying— remarking—that […]

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]]> Unreasonableness and Rights: On Quong’s Liberalism without Perfection https://www.argumenta.org/article/unreasonableness-rights-quongs/ Sun, 15 May 2016 20:12:28 +0000 https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&p=478 Let me start with two questions: Do we have a moral right to do wrong—that is, to engage in morally wrong conduct? And do we have a moral right to be unreasonable—that is, to engage in unreasonable conduct?2 Quong’s answer to the first question is ‘yes’, and to the second question, ‘no’ (LWP: 305 ff.). […]

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