Let me start with two questions: Do we have a moral right to do wrong—that is, to engage in morally wrong conduct? And do we have a moral right to be unreasonable—that is, to engage in unreasonable conduct?2 Quong’s answer to the first question is ‘yes’, and to the second question, ‘no’ (LWP: 305 ff.). I am inclined to agree with both of Quong’s answers here, but not with the reasons he advances in support of his second answer. And this disagreement may, I think, shed some further light on what we might more generally call the ‘political liberalism project’. First, however, a word of clarification before we get into that. For, more strictly, what both questions are asking is: ‘Do our moral rights include Hohfeldian
claims to other persons’ forbearance from interfering with our morally wrong, or unreasonable, conduct: that is, interfering solely on the grounds that this conduct is morally wrong or unreasonable?