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	<title>Philosophy of mind - Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</title>
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		<title>Perceiving High-Level Properties: An Introduction [Topical Collection]</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/perceiving-high-level-properties-an-introduction-topical-collection/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 18:00:06 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2796</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Suppose you are walking into a park on a grey afternoon while talking on the phone with a friend. Suddenly, a dog comes bounding across the grass, having fun chasing a tennis ball. Then, it snatches the ball and comes back with its tail wagging. Suppose also that, since catching a certain distraction from you, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/perceiving-high-level-properties-an-introduction-topical-collection/">Perceiving High-Level Properties: An Introduction [Topical Collection]</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>How Can a Landscape Be Melancholic? A Phenomenological Account of Objectual Expressivity</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/how-can-a-landscape-be-melancholic-a-phenomenological-account-of-objectual-expressivity/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 24 Apr 2026 17:42:41 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2768</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In this paper, I develop a phenomenological account of expressive qualities, focusing on their nature and on the relation they bear to the things to which they are attributed. Paradigmatic examples of expressive qualities include the cheerfulness of a piece of music, the sadness of a gait, and the serenity of a countryside landscape. These [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/how-can-a-landscape-be-melancholic-a-phenomenological-account-of-objectual-expressivity/">How Can a Landscape Be Melancholic? A Phenomenological Account of Objectual Expressivity</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>Visual Experience, Iconicity &#038; Dretske’s ‘Goldilocks Test’</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/visual-experience-iconicity-dretskes-goldilocks-test/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 12 Apr 2026 16:01:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2760</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The debate concerning whether or not we sometimes perceptually experience ‘high-level’ properties is closely connected to a couple of other topics that have also received very extensive attention over the past few decades. Firstly, whether and to what extent perceptual states can be ‘penetrated’ by cognitive mental states. Secondly, whether and how we might be [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/visual-experience-iconicity-dretskes-goldilocks-test/">Visual Experience, Iconicity & Dretske’s ‘Goldilocks Test’</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>Structural Phenomenal Properties</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/structural-phenomenal-properties/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 12 Apr 2026 15:51:28 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2758</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The debate about the perception of high-level properties is usually framed in terms of experiential content. In particular, the debate focuses on the ‘scope’ or ‘reach’ of perceptual content by considering what types of properties are perceptually represented (e.g., Bayne 2009; Briscoe 2015; Siegel 2006). A common question within this debate is whether human vision [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/structural-phenomenal-properties/">Structural Phenomenal Properties</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>Can Empirical Effects Extend the Reach of Perceptual Content?</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/can-empirical-effects-extend-the-reach-of-perceptual-content/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Mar 2026 07:01:22 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2743</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The debate about the reach of perceptual content focuses on the issue of which properties can be perceived. Let me illustrate it with an example. I look at an apple. Do I only see its roundness and redness, or do I also see the property “being an apple”? I pick up the phone to comfort [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/can-empirical-effects-extend-the-reach-of-perceptual-content/">Can Empirical Effects Extend the Reach of Perceptual Content?</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>The Necessary and Jointly Sufficient Conditions for a Higher-level Property to Be Perceivable</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/the-necessary-and-jointly-sufficient-conditions-for-a-higher-level-property-to-be-perceivable/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Feb 2026 08:39:07 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2735</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Higher-level properties are the properties that typically depend, in a generic way, on low-level properties (colors, shapes, sounds, textures …; these latter properties can be given only via a list, Helton 2016) for their instantiation. Indeed typically at least, some low-level property or other must be instantiated in order for a higher-level property to be&#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/the-necessary-and-jointly-sufficient-conditions-for-a-higher-level-property-to-be-perceivable/">The Necessary and Jointly Sufficient Conditions for a Higher-level Property to Be Perceivable</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>Triangulating Depiction: Pictorial Experience, Vision Science, and the Standard of Correctness</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/triangulating-depiction-pictorial-experience-vision-science-and-the-standard-of-correctness/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 05 Nov 2025 19:26:49 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2672</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Smith’s Film, Art and the Third Culture is dedicated to developing a naturalized aesthetics of film, and at the heart of his proposal for a methodological “triangulation” is the principle that our research should take serious account of three levels of analysis, each with its respective type of evidence: the phenomenological level, the psychological level, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/triangulating-depiction-pictorial-experience-vision-science-and-the-standard-of-correctness/">Triangulating Depiction: Pictorial Experience, Vision Science, and the Standard of Correctness</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>Against the Conceptualist Argument against Sensory Liberalism</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/against-the-conceptualist-argument-against-sensory-liberalism/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Oct 2025 08:28:58 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2665</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>A debate that has recently taken centre stage in the philosophy of perception concerns the width of the range of perceivable properties (Siegel 2006, 2010; Bayne 2009; Fish 2013; Reiland 2014; Burnston 2023). Two main parties have up to now dominated the camp, namely, the so-called conservative party that claims that that range only encompasses [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/against-the-conceptualist-argument-against-sensory-liberalism/">Against the Conceptualist Argument against Sensory Liberalism</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>True Beliefs and Intentional Actions: Revisiting Gettier’s and Chisholm’s Arguments</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/true-beliefs-and-intentional-actions-revisiting-gettiers-and-chisholms-arguments/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Jul 2025 11:06:55 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2579</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The contemporary debate in analytic philosophy concerning the relationship between knowledge, justification, and rationality has highlighted, among other things, profound connections between theoretical and practical rationality—a relationship whose conceptual distinction has long been presupposed in the history of philosophy. Descriptively, theoretical rationality pertains to what it is rational to believe and is concerned with knowledge, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/true-beliefs-and-intentional-actions-revisiting-gettiers-and-chisholms-arguments/">True Beliefs and Intentional Actions: Revisiting Gettier’s and Chisholm’s Arguments</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>On Standard Naïve Realism</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/on-standard-naive-realism/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2025 06:35:47 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2570</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>When Sophie sees a red apple before her for what it is, she undergoes a distinctive kind of mental event: a visual experience. Visual experiences have a phenomenal character, or, equivalently, they are phenomenally conscious mental events—there is something it is like for a subject to undergo them. What is the nature of these phenomenally [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/on-standard-naive-realism/">On Standard Naïve Realism</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>Liberal Naturalism, Human Sciences, and Psychoanalysis</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/liberal-naturalism-human-sciences-and-psychoanalysis-2/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2025 08:34:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2544</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>According to the proposal with which Quine (1969) launched contemporary epistemological naturalism, because the only reliable scientific method is that of the natural sciences, any entity that does not figure in the explanations and theorizations derived from it must be discarded. Nevertheless, from the very moment of defining the criterion of ontological commitment (Quine 1948), [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/liberal-naturalism-human-sciences-and-psychoanalysis-2/">Liberal Naturalism, Human Sciences, and Psychoanalysis</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>The Transplant Intuition as an Argument for the Biological Approach</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/the-transplant-intuition-as-an-argument-for-the-biological-approach-2/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2025 08:27:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2542</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The persistence problem of personal identity can be formulated as follows: “If a person x exists at one time and something y exists at another time, under what possible circumstances is it the case that x is y?” (Olson 2017). Broadly speaking, two main perspectives offer different answers to this question. The biological approach claims [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/the-transplant-intuition-as-an-argument-for-the-biological-approach-2/">The Transplant Intuition as an Argument for the Biological Approach</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>Charity and Altruism: Rational Requirements for Action</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/charity-and-altruism-rational-requirements-for-action-2/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2025 08:22:30 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2540</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In the last few years, there has been a growing philosophical interest in the problem of altruism and its definition (see Stich and Walmsley 2020, and Batson 2011). Recently, most of the research in this field has been devoted to giving a definition that would respect the norms of economic rationality and the traditional tendency [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/charity-and-altruism-rational-requirements-for-action-2/">Charity and Altruism: Rational Requirements for Action</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>The Fundamental Basis of the Sense of Us</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/the-fundamental-basis-of-the-sense-of-us/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Jun 2025 16:47:23 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2498</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In humans, the development of social cognition, or the ability to establish social contacts, begins in infancy and relies on building a common basis with others through behaviors such as exchanging gaze, face-to-face interactions, joint attention, etc. As adults, we navigate social interactions based on norms. This challenge, known as social cognition, explores how we [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/the-fundamental-basis-of-the-sense-of-us/">The Fundamental Basis of the Sense of Us</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>Prediction and the Goal of Understanding</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/prediction-and-the-goal-of-understanding/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Jun 2025 09:39:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2491</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In this paper, I analyse the problem of the goal of understanding. The rationale behind this attempt is to answer Trout’s (2017) perplexities about the literature on understanding by offering a functional approach. Understanding has been connected with science and its goals, but only a few attempts—e.g. Hannon (2019)—have been made to explicitly describe its [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/prediction-and-the-goal-of-understanding/">Prediction and the Goal of Understanding</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>Wittgenstein’s Subtraction Question: An Outline of an Answer</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/wittgensteins-subtraction-question-an-outline-of-an-answer/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 14 Jun 2025 06:39:46 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2487</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein asked, “What is left over when we subtract the fact that my arm rises from the fact that I raise my arm?” (Wittgenstein 1953: §621). Our arm can rise because, although we have lost control of it, an invisible wire attached to a machine raises it. This external arm-raising does [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/wittgensteins-subtraction-question-an-outline-of-an-answer/">Wittgenstein’s Subtraction Question: An Outline of an Answer</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>I Don’t Feel like That! A Phenomenology-Free Approach to Moods</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/i-dont-feel-like-that-a-phenomenology-free-approach-to-moods-2/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Dec 2024 07:24:32 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2414</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Being in a bad mood is something that everybody has experienced at least once in a lifetime. Considering the world to be a terrible place, holding beliefs about negative things, etc. are all experiences that anybody in a depressive mood may have had. Like emotions, moods are a common occurrence in our mental lives. Usually, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/i-dont-feel-like-that-a-phenomenology-free-approach-to-moods-2/">I Don’t Feel like That! A Phenomenology-Free Approach to Moods</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>Is What Matters Present in a Fission Scenario? A Conventionalist Response to Noonan [Article Discussion]</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/is-what-matters-present-in-a-fission-scenario-a-conventionalist-response-to-noonan-article-discussion/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Dec 2024 07:14:21 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2410</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Among the many contributions that Derek Parfit made to the debate on personal identity, his argument from the possibility of fission to the unimportance of identity stands out for its relevance (Parfit 1984: 253–266). Recently, Eric Olson revisited this argument, claiming it does not work if one accepts Parfit’s ontology (Olson 2019). In this regard, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/is-what-matters-present-in-a-fission-scenario-a-conventionalist-response-to-noonan-article-discussion/">Is What Matters Present in a Fission Scenario? A Conventionalist Response to Noonan [Article Discussion]</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>The Fission Argument for the Unimportance of Identity Cannot Be Correct [Article Discussion]</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/the-fission-argument-for-the-unimportance-of-identity-cannot-be-correct-article-discussion/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Dec 2024 07:09:37 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2408</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Sometimes, occasionally, something new and important is added to a long-running philosophical debate. Eric Olson (2019) has made just such an addition to the discussion started by Parfit (1971) of the argument from the possibility of fission to the unimportance of&#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/the-fission-argument-for-the-unimportance-of-identity-cannot-be-correct-article-discussion/">The Fission Argument for the Unimportance of Identity Cannot Be Correct [Article Discussion]</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>Author Meets Critics. Session on Metaphysical Emergence: Replies [Book Symposium]</title>
		<link>https://www.argumenta.org/article/author-meets-critics-session-on-metaphysical-emergence-replies/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Massimo Dell'Utri]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Dec 2024 06:51:25 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.argumenta.org/?post_type=article&#038;p=2405</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>I’d like to start by thanking Simone Gozzano, the patient editor and shepherd of this volume, Massimo Dell’Utri, the benevolent editor-in-chief of Argumenta, and Michele Paolini Paoletti, who initially suggested that an issue of Argumenta be devoted to Metaphysical Emergence. Simone, special thanks for your encouragement and your efforts; this is a great honour for [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.argumenta.org/article/author-meets-critics-session-on-metaphysical-emergence-replies/">Author Meets Critics. Session on Metaphysical Emergence: Replies [Book Symposium]</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.argumenta.org">Argumenta - Journal of Analytic Philosophy</a>.</p>]]></description>
		
		
		
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