A debate that has recently taken centre stage in the philosophy of perception concerns the width of the range of perceivable properties (Siegel 2006, 2010; Bayne 2009; Fish 2013; Reiland 2014; Burnston 2023). Two main parties have up to now dominated the camp, namely, the so-called conservative party that claims that that range only encompasses low-level properties (LLPs) such as colour, shape, motion (as for the visual modality), and the liberal party that claims that the range of perceivable properties also encompasses high-level properties (HLPs). The unity of the liberal camp has recently been challenged by the emergence of a position that has brought into question the way in which the liberals have characterized the nature of high-level perceptual phenomenology. Although this issue had not received much attention among the leading proponents of the liberal position, the somewhat implicit consensus was that the phenomenology of high-level perception was, like the phenomenology of low-level perception, purely sensory. And yet, some people who take themselves to be liberals have recently challenged this implicit assumption putting forward a version of liberalism that…
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