Wittgenstein famously asked: What is left when we subtract the fact that my arm rises from the fact that I raise it? Any adequate theory of action must clarify the difference between actions of this kind and mere bodily movements. Plausible answers since the 1950s have been broadly causal. The readiest answer—that causation by an intention is the missing element—is oversimple. Intentionality, however, may be crucial even if intentions alone cannot provide an answer. Elizabeth Anscombe apparently favored reasons for acting; but reasons in the abstract, say as true propositions, are not events and can rationalize actions without explaining them. Cognitive-motivational accounts of action apparently can answer Wittgenstein’s question. These appeal to beliefs as paradigms of the cognitive and desires as paradigms of the conative. Beliefs, desires, and intentions, however, are dispositional elements and explain actions only with the presupposition of related events that play a triggering role in eliciting manifestations of those dispositions. Must these triggers be volitions? Can triggers be cues, or might they be other kinds of ordinary events that action theory should countenance? This paper pursues these questions and outlines the role of both intentional attitudes and related events in explaining intentional actions.