Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy

Katerina Deligiorgi in Issue 8

Science, Thought and Nature: Hegel’s Completion of Kant’s Idealism [Special Issue]

History of Analytic Philosophy, Metaphysics, Theoretical philosophy

Focusing on Hegel’s engagement with Kant’s theoretical philosophy, the paper shows the merits of its characterisation as “completion”. The broader aim is to offer a fresh perspective on familiar historical arguments and on contemporary discussions of philosophical naturalism by examining the distinctive combination of idealism and naturalism that motivates the priority both authors accord to the topics of testability of philosophical claims and of the nature of the relation between…

Elena Ficara in Issue 8

Hegel on the Naturalness of Logic: An Account Based on the Preface to the second edition of the Science of Logic [Special Issue]

History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophical logic

The preface to the second edition of Hegel’s Science of Logic is crucial for understanding the idea of Hegel’s logic. It is an important text because what Hegel writes is not an idiosyncratic view about logic, but rather something universally true about the object, scope, and nature of logic. Something that can genuinely dialogue with more recent, and perhaps more sophisticated, accounts of logic. One central aspect of Hegel’s argumentation…

David Ciavatta in Issue 8

Spiritualized Nature: Hegel on the Transformative Character of Work and History [Special Issue]

History of Analytic Philosophy, Metaphysics

It is argued that one of Hegel’s main strategies in overcoming the opposition between nature and spirit is to recognize a realm of “spiritualized nature” that has a distinctive ontological character of its own, one that, though it is rooted in nature, must be understood in essentially historical terms. It is argued that for Hegel the activity of work is premised upon a commitment to the independent standing of such…

Stefan Bird-Pollan in Issue 8

Hegel’s Naturalism, the Negative and the First Person Standpoint [Special Issue]

History of Analytic Philosophy, Metaphysics

In this paper I attempt to move the discussion of Hegel’s naturalism past what I present as an impasse between the soft naturalist interpretation of Hegel’s notion of Geist, in which Geist is continuous with nature, and the opposing claim that Geist is essentially normative and self-legislating. In order to do so I suggest we look to the question of value which underlies this dispute. While soft naturalists seek to…

Antón Barba-Kay in Issue 8

Hegel’s Dialectical Art [Special Issue]

History of Analytic Philosophy, Metaphysics

Most contemporary accounts of naturalism specify, as one of its necessary conditions, a community within which agents can take themselves to be adequately answerable for and responsible to the norms of autonomous practical reason. But what would it mean to succeed in giving an account of naturalism, absent such social conditions? What does it mean to think about naturalism from a position of relative alienation? My contention is that this…

Dean Moyar in Issue 8

Hegel’s Fact of Reason: Life and Death in the Experience of Freedom [Special Issue]

History of Analytic Philosophy, Metaphysics

This paper shows how Hegel transforms Kant’s Fact of Reason argument for freedom, and in particular how Hegel takes over the role of experience and death in Kant’s “Gallows Man” illustration of the Fact. I reconstruct a central thread of the Phenomenology of Spirit in which Hegel develops his view of freedom and practical rationality through a series of life and death experiences undergone by “shapes of consciousness”. While Hegel…

Andrew Werner in Issue 8

Some Limits to Hegel’s Appeal to Life [Special Issue]

History of Analytic Philosophy, Meta-Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophical logic

For two hundred years, people have been trying to make sense of Hegel’s so-called “dialectical method”. Helpfully, Hegel frequently compares this method with the idea of life, or the organic (cf., e.g., PhG 2, 34, 56). This comparison has become very popular in the literature (in, e.g., Pippin, Beiser, and Ng). Typically, scholars who invoke the idea of life also note that the comparison has limits and that no organic…

Michael J. Shaffer in Issue 8

Reichenbach, Russell and the Metaphysics of Induction

Epistemology, History of Analytic Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophical logic

Hans Reichenbach’s pragmatic treatment of the problem of induction in his later works on inductive inference was, and still is, of great interest. However, it has been dismissed as a pseudo-solution and it has been regarded as problematically obscure. This is, in large part, due to the difficulty in understanding exactly what Reichenbach’s solution is supposed to amount to, especially as it appears to offer no response to the inductive…

Yuval Eylon in Issue 8

All Constitutive Rules are Created Equal [Discussion]

Epistemology, History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophical logic

Constitutive rules are traditionally conceived as defining what does count as a move within a practice and what does not (Williamson 1996). In the context of games, this means that constitutive rules define what counts as playing the given game. Thus, it follows that a player who intentionally breaks the rules of the game is not playing the game.