Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy

Jaap Hage in Issue 7

Two Concepts of Constitutive Rules [Special Issue]

Ontology, Philosophy of language, Theoretical philosophy

In this article, it is argued that rules have two main functions, the practice-defining function and the constraining (fact-to-fact) function. These two functions are compatible. In their function as constraints, some rules are also indirectly regulative. In both of their functions, rules differ from the summaries (rules of thumb) that Rawls discussed and opposed to the constitutive (fact-to-fact) rules which make that some decisions are the right ones. In his…

Frederick Schauer in Issue 7

The Occasions of Law (and the Occasions of Interpretation) [Special Issue]

Philosophy of law, Theoretical philosophy

When John Searle observed that there is “no remark without remarkableness,” he made a point about the pragmatics of conversation that is importantly applicable to legal interpretation. Just as the act of remarking, according to Searle, presupposes some reason for the remark, so too does the act of legal interpretation presuppose a reason to interpret. This paper explores this phenomenon, and identifies the distinct occasions that call for an act…

John Searle in Issue 7

Constitutive Rules [Special Issue]

Philosophy of language, Theoretical philosophy

Regulative rules regulate preexisting forms of behavior, constitutive rules make possible new forms of behavior. They constitute the phenomena they regulate. Brute facts can exist independently of any institutions. Institutional facts require pre-existing institutions, which consist of systems of constitutive rules. Constitutive rules create new forms of reality, with new powers, they typically require language, and they are the basis of human civilization.  

William Butchard, Robert D'Amico in Issue 7

Searle On Normativity and Institutional Metaphysics [Special Issue]

History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of language

In Speech Acts Searle argued for a version of philosophical naturalism by, in part, replying to G.E. Moore’s famous claim that naturalism, if it included any evaluative claims, would be clearly fallacious. We make the case that Searle’s reply was not the disaster it is sometimes claimed to have been. In our discussion we pay special attention to Searle’s introduction of such key concepts as brute facts, institutional facts, and…

Guglielmo Feis in Issue 7

 Meta-Meta-institutional Concepts? [Special Issue]

History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of law, Theoretical philosophy

The paper is a critical analysis of Hubert Schwyzer’s idea of meta-institutional concepts. First, I isolate a presupposition in Schwyzer’s example of chess as ritual. I then show how Schwyzer’s idea of meta-institutional concepts is far from being the endgame in the research on levels of institutionality. In fact, we can iterate on meta-institutional concepts. Schwyzer’s idea has to face an infinite regress. I try to avoid such a regress…

Maurizio Ferraris in Issue 7

Constitutive Rules: The Manifest Image and the Deep Image. [Special Issue]

History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of mind, Theoretical philosophy

Social objects originate from constitutive rules. But there are two ways of explaining the relationship between them. I call them “Manifest Image” and “Deep Image”. The former depends on Searle’s interpretation of social reality and it is based on collective intentionality; the latter is the one I support and it is based on documentality. Indeed, recordings and documents are sufficient to explain how and why social world exists. There is…

Terry Godlove in Issue 7

Constitutive Rules, Normativity, and A Priori Truth. [Special Issue]

History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of language, Theoretical philosophy

This paper develops an argument which seems to yield a set of a priori rules—rules which are constitutive of, but not normative for, thought and experience. I contrast the resulting Kantian sense of a priori truth as independent of all experience, because presupposed by it, with the use Searle makes of a priori truth by stipulation or definition. By focusing on the a priori rules of thought and experience we…

Bartosz Kaluziński in Issue 7

What Does It Mean That Constitutive Rules Are in Force? [Special Issue]

History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of language

The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the issue of how we can understand constitutive rules as being in force for participants S in some rule-constituted practice. We take a look on complicated team-games that are broadly conceived as model example of rule-constituted practices. We claim that rules of games are dependent on mental states of participants in that practice. More precisely, they are in force…

Filip Kobiela in Issue 7

The Ludic Background of Constitutive Rules in Bernard Suits [Special Issue]

History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of language, Theoretical philosophy

The main purpose of the paper is to present and discuss Bernard Suits’ account of constitutive rules presented in his opus magnum—The Grasshopper. Games, Life and Utopia—and in several minor contributions, which supplement or modify his original position. This account will be regarded as a crucial part of Suits’ theory of ludic activities, mainly game-playing. The stress will be put on peculiarities of constitutive rules—their relation to ends in games,…