Near-term bias (NTB), a preference for nearer over later goods of equal value, is widely thought to be prudentially irrational. Dale Dorsey has recently argued that it is, but by an argument that avoids the question-begging character of the traditional appeal to anticipated regret. On his view, it is unsavory to regret a past act performed from NTB while being presently disposed to perform the same act, and this shows NTB to be irrational. I argue that Dorsey’s argument does not improve on the traditional one: the unsavoriness he identifies depends, in the end, on the expectation of future regret, and the claim that regret’s action-guiding force must be heeded itself presupposes that NTB is irrational. I then propose an alternative account on which NTB is contingently irrational. Where regret for past NTB reveals enduring values that conflict with one’s present pro-attitude toward acting from NTB, acting on that pro-attitude is prudentially irrational, independently of any anticipated regret.