Charity and Altruism: Rational Requirements for Action
Issue: • Author/s: Caterina Di Maio
Topics: Epistemology, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action
This paper discusses the possibility of altruism based on the linguistic, and then practical notion of charity, to distinguish it from psychological and ethical selfishness. My starting hypothesis is, as Thomas Nagel argued, that altruism could be interpreted as a rational requirement for action. This hypothesis arises from a specific approach in analytical philosophy to the problem of explaining action, which combines the concepts of charity and altruism in a single interpretative framework about others. My aim is to present a common thread linking the thought of Willard Van Orman…
True Beliefs and Intentional Actions: Revisiting Gettier’s and Chisholm’s Arguments
Issue: • Author/s: Caterina Di Maio
Topics: Epistemology, Philosophy of action, Philosophy of language, Philosophy of mind
This paper explores the structural parallels between Gettier’s challenge to the justified true belief account of knowledge and Chisholm’s problem of wayward causal chains in action theory. Despite their distinct domains, both issues highlight the necessity of an adequate connection between explanation, justification, and outcome. Based on this analysis, this paper argues that the distinction between theoretical and practical rationality is less rigid than traditionally assumed. The paper further contends that, while a solution to the issue of wayward causal chains can at least be hypothesized, previous analyses have primarily…
Charity and Altruism: Rational Requirements for Action
Issue: Issue 20 • Author/s: Caterina Di Maio
Topics: Epistemology, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of action, Philosophy of mind
This paper discusses the possibility of altruism based on the linguistic, and then practical notion of charity, to distinguish it from psychological and ethical selfishness. My starting hypothesis is, as Thomas Nagel argued, that altruism could be interpreted as a rational requirement for action. This hypothesis arises from a specific approach in analytical philosophy to the problem of explaining action, which combines the concepts of charity and altruism in a single interpretative framework about others. My aim is to present a common thread linking the thought of Willard Van Orman…