Constitutive Rules, Normativity, and A Priori Truth. [Special Issue]
Issue: Issue 07 • Author/s: Terry Godlove
Topics: History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of language, Theoretical philosophy
This paper develops an argument which seems to yield a set of a priori rules—rules which are constitutive of, but not normative for, thought and experience. I contrast the resulting Kantian sense of a priori truth as independent of all experience, because presupposed by it, with the use Searle makes of a priori truth by stipulation or definition. By focusing on the a priori rules of thought and experience we can make good on the sense of constitutivity that Searle had in mind in his early work. By virtue of…
All Constitutive Rules are Created Equal [Discussion]
Issue: Issue 08 • Author/s: Yuval Eylon
Topics: Epistemology, History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophical logic
Constitutive rules are traditionally conceived as defining what does count as a move within a practice and what does not (Williamson 1996). In the context of games, this means that constitutive rules define what counts as playing the given game. Thus, it follows that a player who intentionally breaks the rules of the game is not playing the game.