Is Psychologism Unavoidable in a Phenomenologically Adequate Account of Mental Content? [Special Issue]
Issue: Issue 18 • Author/s: Elisabetta Sacchi
Topics: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of language, Philosophy of mind, Theoretical philosophy
In my paper I focus on psychologism in the theory of mental content and critically consider a variety of it—“intentional psychologism” (Pitt 2009)—that has recently entered the stage in the philosophy of mind literature. My aim is twofold. First, I want to provide a critical evaluation of this new variety of psychologism, considering in particular whether it is immune from (some of) the most famous classical criticisms. Secondly, I want to provide a diagnosis of what ultimately motivates the current revival of the “psychologistic attitude”. My aim in so doing…
Conscious Experiences as Ultimate Seemings: Renewing the Phenomenal Concept Strategy [Special Issue]
Issue: Issue 02 • Author/s: François Kammerer
Topics: Epistemology, Philosophy of mind
The Phenomenal Concept Strategy is a popular strategy used to support physicalism in the realm of conscious experience. This Strategy accounts for dualist intuitions but uses the ways in which we think about our experiences to explain these intuitions in a physicalist framework, without any appeal to ontological dualism. In this paper, I will raise two issues related to the currently available versions of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. First, most of the theories belonging to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy posit that phenomenal concepts are exceptional and sui generis concepts, and…