Impossible Worlds and the Intensional Sense of ‘And’ [Special Issue]
Issue: Issue 04 • Author/s: Luis Estrada-González
Topics: History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophical logic
In this paper I show that the ‘and’ in an argument like Lewis’ against concrete impossible worlds cannot be simply assumed to be extensional. An allegedly ‘and’-free argument against impossible worlds employing an alternative definition of ‘contradiction’ can be presented, but besides falling prey of the usual objections to the negation involved in it, such ‘and’-free argument is not quite so since it still needs some sort of premise-binding, thus intensional ‘and’ is needed and that suffices to block the argument at a stage prior to the steps about negation.
Believing the Formless? [Special Issue]
Issue: Issue 15 • Author/s: Giuseppe Varnier, Salvatore Pistoia-Reda
Topics: Philosophy of language, Philosophy of mind, Theoretical philosophy
In this note, we discuss the analyticity puzzle affecting the logicality of language hypothesis. The analyticity puzzle is the fact that only some analyticities result in ungrammaticality, which seems to conflict with the idea that an inferential device plays a role in determining the set of the possible sentences of the language. The literature includes two solutions to account for this puzzling evidence. According to one of the solutions, the deductive system can access both ungrammatical and grammatical trivialities, though only the latter can be rescued, i.e. made informative, via…