Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy

In the debate about the reach of perceptual content, some philosophers have appealed to empirical effects as a test for the existence of high-level perception (HLP). Among these effects, perceptual adaptation and perceptual learning have played a major role. In this paper, I will discuss two skeptical challenges to relying on these effects as tests for HLP. The first challenge interrogates their nature as a perceptual process. The second challenge raises doubts regarding their usefulness in specifying the target high-level property.

In the debate about the reach of perceptual content, some philosophers have appealed to empirical effects as a test for the existence of high-level perception (HLP). Among these effects, perceptual adaptation and perceptual learning have played a major role. In this paper, I will discuss two skeptical challenges to relying on these effects as tests for HLP. The first challenge interrogates their nature as a perceptual process. The second challenge raises doubts regarding their usefulness in specifying the target high-level property.

This paper investigates the perceptual nature of affective properties—qualities such as sadness, excitement, boredom, or comfort—that we experience as belonging to objects, environments, or events. I propose a taxonomy that distinguishes three classes of affective properties: arousal properties, expressive properties, and affective affordances, each characterized by different relations to perception, affectivity, and response dependence. Drawing on philosophical accounts of high-level perception and ecological psychology, I argue that these properties can be considered at least partly perceptual insofar as they contribute to the phenomenal character of experience. I then explore how…