Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy

In this paper, we explore the interplay between moral expertise and moral understanding. Specifically, by focusing on moral understanding rather than on moral knowledge, whether there is a way to rethink moral expertise without embracing moral realism will be assessed. The main theoretical gain is that an understanding-based account of moral expertise can explain why moral testimony is suspicious, while the standard account cannot. In this respect, for an understanding-based account of moral expertise to really count as an alternative to realist and knowledge-based ones, some points have to be…

In the Ethics, Spinoza famously rejects freedom of the will. He also offers an error theory for why many believe, falsely, that the will is free. Standard accounts of his arguments for these claims focus on their efficacy against incompatibilist views of free will. For Spinoza, the will cannot be free since it is determined by an infinite chain of external causes. And the pervasive belief in free will arises from a structural limitation of our self-knowledge: because we are aware of our actions but unaware of their causes, we…

The ability to socialize in early life depends on developing commonalities with others. But what exactly constitutes the “sense of us” or the “we-perspective”? The interaction theory (IT) offers an attractive alternative to mindreading theories, such as theory-theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST), by presenting a further development of enactivism. During embodied interactions, individuals “directly” and “smartly” perceive the mental states of others. Despite the intuitive appeal of direct acquaintance with others’ mental states, IT relies on crude metaphors. We aim to retain IT’s core intuition—the embodied, embedded, enactive, and…

This paper explores the structural, ethical, and regulatory impediments to effective privacy protection in the healthcare sector, conceptualised as the “triangle of death for medical data privacy.” The triangle comprises three mutually reinforcing elements: (1) the irresistible convenience of insecure digital tools for healthcare professionals; (2) the underdeveloped privacy risk perception among patients; and (3) an accountability vacuum in regulatory enforcement. While European laws like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) are in place, real-world practices, especially the use of WhatsApp by clinical staff, illustrate the systemic failure to protect…

In this paper, we provide a novel definition of moralism as a failure in moral judgment, and we seek to identify its two main sources (relational and substantive). After defining moralism, we spell out a taxonomy of different kinds of moralism, the opposite—yet equally defective—moral failures, and the corresponding correct attitudes. Then, we examine how some proximate notions (judgmentalism, moral fury, hypocrisy, paternalism, puritanism, moral grandstanding) may have parallels with or differ from one or more of the four kinds of moralism identified. Finally, we argue that for there to…

This paper explores the structural parallels between Gettier’s challenge to the justified true belief account of knowledge and Chisholm’s problem of wayward causal chains in action theory. Despite their distinct domains, both issues highlight the necessity of an adequate connection between explanation, justification, and outcome. Based on this analysis, this paper argues that the distinction between theoretical and practical rationality is less rigid than traditionally assumed. The paper further contends that, while a solution to the issue of wayward causal chains can at least be hypothesized, previous analyses have primarily…

Wittgenstein famously asked: What is left when we subtract the fact that my arm rises from the fact that I raise it? Any adequate theory of action must clarify the difference between actions of this kind and mere bodily movements. Plausible answers since the 1950s have been broadly causal. The readiest answer—that causation by an intention is the missing element—is oversimple. Intentionality, however, may be crucial even if intentions alone cannot provide an answer. Elizabeth Anscombe apparently favored reasons for acting; but reasons in the abstract, say as true propositions,…

Coping is customarily understood as those thoughts and actions humans adopt while undergoing situations appraised as threatening and stressful, or when people’s sense of who they are and what they should do is significantly challenged. In these cases, coping thoughts and actions help one endure and hopefully overcome these stresses, threats, and/or challenges. Discussions of coping are common among psychologists, but nearly absent from the philosophical literature despite their importance in theories of agency and for closely related concepts like resilience. Building from psychological theories of coping, I offer a…

Generally speaking, the present literature on agency has been heavily focused on human agency. This approach proves to be very useful for the immediate applications of the philosophy of agency, e.g. to develop a definition ready for use in ethics or political philosophy. However, there are some limitations to this line of thought, as, for instance, it poses too restrictive requirements on agency, like purposefulness, consciousness, or willingness. In this paper, I would like to tackle the question of agency with the need to include non-human agency in mind. I…

The role of intention in criminal law stands in stark contrast to that of motive. While intention’s significance for criminal liability is hardly ever contested, motive’s relevance is most frequently relegated to the peripheries. This is, I believe, a mistake, and I hope to amend it by providing a novel argument in favour of motive’s relevance to criminal liability: an argument premised not on normative considerations, but on the very nature of motive itself. An agent’s motives, I will argue, are her ‘focal desires’. Desires, as I will illustrate in…