Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy

 

Prediction and the Goal of Understanding

Issue: • Author/s: Sofia Elisabetta Walters
Topics: Cognitive science, Epistemology, Philosophy of mind, Philosophy of science

This paper explores the problem of the goal of understanding, proposing that understanding may be linked to prediction. The approach taken is functional and evolutionary, and it integrates an epistemological perspective with the insights of the predictive processing models of cognition. I first consider the possible goals of understanding, taking as few epistemological assumptions as possible. I take into account the notions of ends in themselves and of explanations, and I distinguish between internally-oriented goals and externally-oriented goals. Then I present how prediction might be connected with the goal of…

Toxic Conspiracy Theories as Epistemically Illuminating Falsehoods

Issue: • Author/s: David Buzaglo
Topics: Epistemology, Theoretical philosophy

This paper explores the epistemic implications of endorsing a specific category of conspiracy theories, which I term “toxic conspiracy theories” (following Basham, 2018). I contend that these theories exert a profound and distinctive impact on our belief system, not only shaping perspectives on the specific events they are purported to explain, but also influencing our broader understanding of sociopolitical reality. I delineate a surprising result of this doxastically encompassing nature of toxic conspiracy theories: if some toxic conspiracy theory is true, then a belief in a false one can be…

Understanding with Epistemic Possibilities: The Epistemic Aim and Value of Metaphysics [Special Issue]

Issue: Issue 19 • Author/s: Ylwa Sjölin Wirling
Topics: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ontology, Philosophy of science, Theoretical philosophy

According to a recent proposal, the epistemic aim of metaphysics as a discipline is to chart the different viable theories of metaphysical objects of inquiry (e.g. causation, persistence). This paper elaborates on and seeks to improve on that proposal in two related ways. First, drawing on an analogy with how-possibly explanation in science, I argue that we can usefully understand this aim of metaphysics as the charting of epistemically possible answers to metaphysical questions. Second, I argue that in order to account for the epistemic goodness of this aim, one…