Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy

 

Constitutive Rules, Normativity, and A Priori Truth. [Special Issue]

Issue: Issue 7 • Author/s: Terry Godlove
Topics: History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of language, Theoretical philosophy

This paper develops an argument which seems to yield a set of a priori rules—rules which are constitutive of, but not normative for, thought and experience. I contrast the resulting Kantian sense of a priori truth as independent of all experience, because presupposed by it, with the use Searle makes of a priori truth by stipulation or definition. By focusing on the a priori rules of thought and experience we can make good on the sense of constitutivity that Searle had in mind in his early work. By virtue of…

What Does It Mean That Constitutive Rules Are in Force? [Special Issue]

Issue: Issue 7 • Author/s: Bartosz Kaluziński
Topics: History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of language

The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the issue of how we can understand constitutive rules as being in force for participants S in some rule-constituted practice. We take a look on complicated team-games that are broadly conceived as model example of rule-constituted practices. We claim that rules of games are dependent on mental states of participants in that practice. More precisely, they are in force for the participants S of such games if these participants jointly meet the following conditions: (1) every S has a…

Analytic Philosophy and European Culture – Filosofia analitica e cultura europea

Issue: Issue 2 • Author/s: Umberto Eco
Topics: History of Analytic Philosophy, Theoretical philosophy

This is a talk for the Round Table that rounded off the 6th National Conference of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy (SIFA), Genoa 2004. Given the subject of Eco’s talk, it is worth noting that the Round Table was held in the Carlo Felice opera house and, perhaps because of the presence of Eco, there was standing room only. The conference to which the event was annexed was held in the classrooms of the Philosophy Department of the University of Genoa in via Balbi. Questa è la trascrizione di…

Putnam on Methods of Inquiry

Issue: Issue 3 • Author/s: Gary Ebbs
Topics: Epistemology, History of Analytic Philosophy

Hilary Putnam’s paradigm-changing clarifications of our methods of inquiry in science and everyday life are central to his philosophy. He takes for granted that the judgments of scientists are for the most part reasonable and not in need of philosophical support, and that no part of our supposed knowledge is unrevisable or guaranteed to be true. He infers from key episodes in the history of science that our language contains terms whose references may remain unchanged despite radical changes in our theories, and that some statements are so basic for…

The Ludic Background of Constitutive Rules in Bernard Suits [Special Issue]

Issue: Issue 7 • Author/s: Filip Kobiela
Topics: History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of language, Theoretical philosophy

The main purpose of the paper is to present and discuss Bernard Suits’ account of constitutive rules presented in his opus magnum—The Grasshopper. Games, Life and Utopia—and in several minor contributions, which supplement or modify his original position. This account will be regarded as a crucial part of Suits’ theory of ludic activities, mainly game-playing. The stress will be put on peculiarities of constitutive rules—their relation to ends in games, players’ attitudes and their limitative nature. The analysis of the consequences of breaking a rule in different types of actions…

Constitutive Rules and the Internal Point of View [Special Issue]

Issue: Issue 7 • Author/s: Corrado Roversi
Topics: History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of language, Theoretical philosophy

In this paper, I connect J.R. Searle’s concept of constitutive rules and H.L.A. Hart’s concept of internal point of view and look for an extension of this joint paradigm in institutional ontology. I make a distinction between five different perspectives about an institution—structural, teleological, axiological, strategic, and sociological—and connect these perspectives to three kinds of concepts: institutional, meta-institutional, and para-institutional. In the light of these distinctions, I submit that an explanation of institutional phenomena requires a three-dimensional ontology consisting of a structure (framed by constitutive rules), a conceptual background, and…
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