Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy


Towards Reconciling Two Heroes: Habermas and Hegel

Issue: Issue 1 • Author/s: Robert B. Brandom
Topics: Meta-Philosophy

I describe my engagement with Habermas’s ideas, and sketch a way of reading of Hegel that I take to be consonant with the deepest lessons I have learned from Habermas. I read Hegel as having a social, linguistic theory of normativity, and an exclusively retrospective conception of progress and the sense in which history exhibits teleological normativity.

Some Remarks on Philosophy and on Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy and its Misinterpretation

Issue: Issue 1 • Author/s: Peter Hacker
Topics: Meta-Philosophy

The paper advances a broadly Wittgensteinian conception of the nature and limits of philosophy. It differs from Wittgenstein over the claims that (i) philosophical problems arise only when language is idling; (ii) that philosophy does not result in new knowledge: it does. But the new knowledge does not concern the nature of the world, but the character of our forms of description of the world, and its form is not discovery but realisation. (iii) in the domain of practical philosophy further considerations come into play that are not budgeted for…

True but Also Not True

Issue: Issue 3 • Author/s: Stefano Boscolo, Giulia Pravato
Topics: Meta-Philosophy, Theoretical philosophy

We present three ways of expressing a possible interpretative uncertainty of the truth predicate: ambiguity, context-sensitivity and semantic indeterminacy. Next, we examine Kölbel (2008)’s pluralist view that “true” is ambiguous between a substantialist concept and a deflationist concept, and that it is ambiguous as the word “dog” is between “male dog” and “canine”. Our main goal is to show that Kölbel’s thesis does not withstand empirical scrutiny in the sense that “true” fails most of the well-established tests for ambiguity (conjunction-reduction, contradiction, and ellipsis). In addition, we reformulate Kölbel’s thesis…

Literature and Practical Knowledge

Issue: Issue 3 • Author/s: Pascal Engel
Topics: Aesthetics, Meta-Philosophy, Theoretical philosophy

This article defends literary cognitivism, the view that literature can convey genuine propositional knowledge, in the form of propositions which are (i) true (ii) justified and (iii) have aesthetic value because they convey such knowledge. I reply to familiar objections to this view, and reformulate it as the thesis that literary knowledge is a form practical knowledge that is only derivatively propositional. I attempt to apply some ideas to be found in Stanley’s and Williamson’s conception of knowing how. Literary knowledge is a kind of practical knowing how of propositions…

Williamson on the psychological view [Special Issue]

Issue: Issue 2 • Author/s: Serena Maria Nicoli
Topics: Epistemology, Meta-Philosophy, Philosophy of mind

What is the nature of the evidence provided by thinking about hypothetical cases, such as those presented in the thought experiments (TE)? Is it psychological, as those who speak about intuitions seem to think, or not? This problem is closely related to that of the nature of the subject matter of philosophy, that most philosophers tend to conceive as non-psychological. Williamson’s position on the matter (Williamson 2007) consists in rejecting the psychological view on intuitions: if we want this method—the armchair method—to provide us with evidence in favour or contra…

The Tracking Dogma in the Philosophy of Emotion

Issue: Issue 4 • Author/s: Talia Morag
Topics: Epistemology, Meta-Philosophy

Modern philosophy of emotion has been largely dominated by what I call the Tracking Dogma, according to which emotions aim at tracking “core relational themes,” features of the environment that bear on our well-being (e.g. fear tracks dangers, anger tracks wrongs). The paper inquires into the empirical credentials of Strong and Weak versions of this dogma. I argue that there is currently insufficient scientific evidence in favor of the Tracking Dogma; and I show that there is a considerable weight of common knowledge against it. I conclude that most emotions…