Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy

Fictional characters may raise serious troubles about their identity even within one and the same story. Nabokov’s novel Pale Fire, for instance, depicts a world pretty much like ours, in which there seems to be no indeterminate identity, yet leaves it open whether the Shade character is the same as the Kinbote character. On the contrary, in Murakami’s The Wind-Up Bird Chronicle, there seems to be two characters, Kumiko and the Woman in the hotel room, that are indeterminately identical. Worse still, there are also cases of inconsistent identity: in…

In this text I intend to show to what extent a certain epistemological understanding of psychoanalysis (fundamentally Freudian) finds parallels with the so-called liberalization process of epistemological naturalism. My thesis is that the sui generis epistemological modalities created by Freud not only coincide with this process, but to a significant degree were precursors of the methodological and ontological innovations that LN (liberal naturalism) proposes to defend and theorize. I begin by reviewing the process of liberalization of epistemic naturalism, from a predominantly physicalist model to a liberal version that takes…

This article summarizes John Locke’s considered views on freedom, explaining that freedom is a power of the mind to act in accordance with its volitions, that freedom is a power that can belong only to substances, that we have the freedom to will in many cases, including the power to hold our wills undetermined and thereby suspend the prosecution of our desires.  This is a seemingly reasonable account of how our minds work, and should work, when we make (important) decisions.  But Locke takes us to be morally responsible and…

The nominal ground that entwines human beings and animal behaviours is unwilling to admit moral valuing as a non-human act. Just to nail it down explicitly, two clauses ramify the moral conscience of human beings as follows: a) Can non-humans be moral beings?, b) Unconscious animal behaviours go beyond any moral judgments. My approach aims to rebuff these anthropomorphic clauses by justifying animals’ moral beings and animals’ moral behaviours from a meta-ethical stance. A meta-ethical outlook may enable an analysis of ethical and normative views through the limit of moral…

In this paper, I show how a pragmatist stance may address the problem of the resolvability of moral conflicts. Pragmatism challenges skeptical and relativist views by arguing that moral conflict resolution is possible via inquiry and exchange of reasons. From a normative standpoint, pragmatism also differs from utilitarian and deontological views, according to which a specific moral theory is correct in every context. From a pragmatist point of view, both utilitarian and deontological responses can be justified, depending on contextual conditions and reasons, on the people to whom reasons are…

In this paper, we explore the interplay between moral expertise and moral understanding. Specifically, by focusing on moral understanding rather than on moral knowledge, whether there is a way to rethink moral expertise without embracing moral realism will be assessed. The main theoretical gain is that an understanding-based account of moral expertise can explain why moral testimony is suspicious, while the standard account cannot. In this respect, for an understanding-based account of moral expertise to really count as an alternative to realist and knowledge-based ones, some points have to be…

Naïve Realism has become increasingly popular as a theory about veridical perceptions. At the heart of this view is the idea that conscious perceptions are relational events, in which mind-independent aspects of the environment are actual constituents of the experience. Despite its growing popularity, several aspects of the naïve realist proposal regarding the nature of veridical perception and its phenomenal character remain unclear. Naïve Realists sometimes disagree on some of their central claims or have yet to fully articulate their commitments on key aspects of the view. In this paper,…

Scholars assume the necessity of epistemic progress (EP) for moral progress (MP), where EP involves forming more accurate moral judgments. This is problematic, since we lack the cognitive control necessary to form accurate moral judgments (Klenk & Sauer 2021). Thus, if it is true that EP is necessary for MP, and if it is true that we are naturally bad epistemic agents, then MP is impossible. Here I consider three possible logical relations between EP and MP: (A) EP is necessary and sufficient for MP, (B) EP is necessary but not sufficient for…

A history is a complete possible temporal evolution of the universe. There are two main conceptions of histories: Lewis’s divergence, in which distinct histories are all disjoint, and the standard branching time (BT) conception, in which histories overlap and branch towards the future (‘open future’). As Greg Restall noted, if a realist conception of histories is adopted, considerations of ontological parsimony favor the standard BT conception over Lewis’s divergence. In this note, I observe that perfectly analogous considerations can be raised against the standard BT conception and in favor of…