Issue: • Author/s: Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira, Victor Machado Barcellos
Topics: Cognitive science, Epistemology, Philosophy of action, Philosophy of mind
The ability to socialize in early life depends on developing commonalities with others. But what exactly constitutes the “sense of us” or the “we-perspective”? The interaction theory (IT) offers an attractive alternative to mindreading theories, such as theory-theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST), by presenting a further development of enactivism. During embodied interactions, individuals “directly” and “smartly” perceive the mental states of others. Despite the intuitive appeal of direct acquaintance with others’ mental states, IT relies on crude metaphors. We aim to retain IT’s core intuition—the embodied, embedded, enactive, and…
Issue: • Author/s: Alberto Voltolini
Topics: Cognitive science, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ontology, Philosophy of mind
In this paper, first of all, I want to give a criterion for the perceivability of higher-level properties, i.e., the properties that depend for their own instantiation on the instantiation of low-level properties (colors, shapes, sounds, textures …); namely, conditions that are necessary and jointly sufficient in order for such a property to be perceivable. Here it is: the higher-level property is given i) immediately; ii) via a grouping operation that involves a perceptual form of attention Moreover, I want to show why some candidate higher-level properties fulfill it and…
Issue: • Author/s: Manfredi Negro
Topics: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Biology
The topic of the relationship between transhumanism and posthumanism is one that has received very little attention over the years. These two quickly growing schools of thought display a rather odd combination of similarities and differences that can make them appear both as completely independent and unrelated, or as heavily connected variations of the same idea. However, only a few attempts have been made at examining how they really correlate to each other. As such, in this article I will attempt to provide an analysis of both transhumanism and posthumanism,…
Issue: • Author/s: Alfonso Muñoz-Corcuera
Topics: Cognitive science, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ontology, Philosophy of mind
One of the primary objections to the biological approach revolves around what is known as the transplant intuition. That is, the allegedly widely shared intuition that if we had our cerebrum transplanted into a different body, we would be transferred to that body along with our cerebrum. Drawing upon our understanding of brain death, this paper argues that either (1) the transplant intuition should be rejected, and the biological approach has the advantage of being consistent with that rejection; or (2) the psychological approach, the biological approach’s main rival, cannot…
Issue: • Author/s: David Buzaglo
Topics: Epistemology, Theoretical philosophy
This paper explores the epistemic implications of endorsing a specific category of conspiracy theories, which I term “toxic conspiracy theories” (following Basham, 2018). I contend that these theories exert a profound and distinctive impact on our belief system, not only shaping perspectives on the specific events they are purported to explain, but also influencing our broader understanding of sociopolitical reality. I delineate a surprising result of this doxastically encompassing nature of toxic conspiracy theories: if some toxic conspiracy theory is true, then a belief in a false one can be…
Issue: • Author/s: Luca Marchetti
Topics: Aesthetics, Cognitive science, Epistemology, Philosophy of mind
Smith’s Film, Art and the Third Culture is dedicated to developing a naturalized aesthetics of film, and at the heart of his proposal for a methodological “triangulation” is the principle that our research should take serious account of three levels of analysis, each with its respective type of evidence: the phenomenological level, the psychological level, and the neurophysiological level. While Smith addresses many aspects of our perceptual, emotional, and cognitive engagement with movies within this framework, he rarely discusses what underlies our visual engagement with films: the fact that they…
Issue: • Author/s: Gabriele Ferretti, Francesco Marchi
Topics: Epistemology, Philosophy of mind, Philosophy of science, Theoretical philosophy
Considerable interest has been recently devoted to analyzing picture perception and its differences from vis-à-vis perception. However, an exhaustive theory of picture perception requires explaining the difference between these two perceptual states and the one we are in when facing pictorial illusions like trompe l’oeils, which foster the impression of being in front of a real object available for interaction. One standard story is that these illusions prevent the viewer from perceiving the surface, which is instead possible with usual pictures, this causing the pictorial space to be perceived as…
Issue: • Author/s: Caterina Di Maio
Topics: Epistemology, Philosophy of action, Philosophy of language, Philosophy of mind
This paper explores the structural parallels between Gettier’s challenge to the justified true belief account of knowledge and Chisholm’s problem of wayward causal chains in action theory. Despite their distinct domains, both issues highlight the necessity of an adequate connection between explanation, justification, and outcome. Based on this analysis, this paper argues that the distinction between theoretical and practical rationality is less rigid than traditionally assumed. The paper further contends that, while a solution to the issue of wayward causal chains can at least be hypothesized, previous analyses have primarily…
Issue: • Author/s: Thomas Raleigh
Topics: Cognitive science, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of mind
Fred Dretske made important contributions to the debate concerning how to distinguish perception from cognition, to the question of whether perceptual content is ‘Rich’ or ‘Sparse’ and to developing the thesis that perceptual experience employs a distinctively iconic format of representation. In Dretske (2015) he offered a method or criterion for determining whether or not two subjects have visual experiences with different phenomenal characters, which he dubbed the ‘Goldilocks Test’. In this paper I criticize Dretske’s proposal, drawing on various visual phenomena in order to argue that this ‘Goldilocks Test’…