Argumenta – Journal of Analytic Philosophy

 

Intentional Relations [Special Issue]

Issue: Issue 4 • Author/s: Mark Sainsbury
Topics: Epistemology, Philosophical logic

Thinking about Obama and thinking about Pegasus seem to be the same kind of thing: both are cases of thinking about something. But they also seem to be different kinds of thing, in that one is relational and the other not. This paper aims to show a way out of the impasse by distinguishing varieties of relationality, concluding that what matters is the two-term relational nature of all intentional states, regardless of whether or not the representations they involve have referents.

Conspiracy Theorists and Monological Belief Systems [Special Issue]

Issue: Issue 6 • Author/s: Kurtis Hagen
Topics: Epistemology, Meta-Philosophy, Philosophical logic, Philosophy of language, Theoretical philosophy

Recent scholarship has claimed to show that conspiracy theorists are prone to simultaneously believe mutually contradictory conspiracy theories, as well as believe entirely made up conspiracy theories. The authors of those studies suggest that this supports the notion that conspiracy theories operate within “monological belief systems”, in which conspiracy theorists find support for conspiratorial beliefs in other conspiratorial beliefs, or in related generalizations, rather than in evidence directly relevant to the conspiracy in question. In this article, I argue that all of that is either wrong or at least misleading.

Hegel on the Naturalness of Logic: An Account Based on the Preface to the second edition of the Science of Logic [Special Issue]

Issue: Issue 8 • Author/s: Elena Ficara
Topics: History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophical logic

The preface to the second edition of Hegel’s Science of Logic is crucial for understanding the idea of Hegel’s logic. It is an important text because what Hegel writes is not an idiosyncratic view about logic, but rather something universally true about the object, scope, and nature of logic. Something that can genuinely dialogue with more recent, and perhaps more sophisticated, accounts of logic. One central aspect of Hegel’s argumentation in the preface is the idea that logic is natural. In this paper, I focus precisely on this aspect, addressing…

Some Limits to Hegel’s Appeal to Life [Special Issue]

Issue: Issue 8 • Author/s: Andrew Werner
Topics: History of Analytic Philosophy, Meta-Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophical logic

For two hundred years, people have been trying to make sense of Hegel’s so-called “dialectical method”. Helpfully, Hegel frequently compares this method with the idea of life, or the organic (cf., e.g., PhG 2, 34, 56). This comparison has become very popular in the literature (in, e.g., Pippin, Beiser, and Ng). Typically, scholars who invoke the idea of life also note that the comparison has limits and that no organic analogy can completely explain the nature of the dialectical method. To my knowledge, however, no scholar has attempted to explain…

Reichenbach, Russell and the Metaphysics of Induction

Issue: Issue 8 • Author/s: Michael J. Shaffer
Topics: Epistemology, History of Analytic Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophical logic

Hans Reichenbach’s pragmatic treatment of the problem of induction in his later works on inductive inference was, and still is, of great interest. However, it has been dismissed as a pseudo-solution and it has been regarded as problematically obscure. This is, in large part, due to the difficulty in understanding exactly what Reichenbach’s solution is supposed to amount to, especially as it appears to offer no response to the inductive skeptic. For entirely different reasons, the significance of Bertrand Russell’s classic attempt to solve Hume’s problem is also both obscure…

Indicative Conditionals as Strict Conditionals

Issue: Issue 7 • Author/s: Andrea Iacona
Topics: Philosophical logic

This paper is intended to show that, at least in a considerably wide class of cases, indicative conditionals are adequately formalized as strict conditionals. The first part of the paper outlines three arguments that support the strict conditional view, that is, three reasons for thinking that an indicative conditional is true just in case it is impossible that its antecedent is true and its consequent is false. The second part of the paper develops the strict conditional view and defends it from some foreseeable objections.  

All Constitutive Rules are Created Equal [Discussion]

Issue: Issue 8 • Author/s: Yuval Eylon
Topics: Epistemology, History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophical logic

Constitutive rules are traditionally conceived as defining what does count as a move within a practice and what does not (Williamson 1996). In the context of games, this means that constitutive rules define what counts as playing the given game. Thus, it follows that a player who intentionally breaks the rules of the game is not playing the game.
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